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ABSTRACT
The haredim in Israel are an ultra-Orthodox Jewish religious group who uphold
the most conservative of Jewish laws. Instead of serving in the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) as all other Israelis do, the haredim are exempted from the IDF’s policy of
universal conscription. This thesis proposes three hypotheses to determine why Israel’s
haredim do not serve in the IDF. First, the haredim do not serve in the IDF because they
do not want to; second, the haredim do not serve because they hold pacifistic political
opinions; and third, the haredim do not serve because Jewish religious tradition forbids
military service. To test these hypotheses, data were gathered by conducting a literature
review and studying Israeli newspapers, official Israeli Government statistics, and
unofficial public opinion surveys. Accordingly, a close examination of both the haredi
worldview and the cultural characteristics of Israel’s haredi communities suggests that
the haredim do not want to serve in the IDF for self-interested reasons. Furthermore, a
survey of haredi political opinions indicates that the majority of haredim exhibit a
hawkish and aggressive political orientation. Finally, an analysis of individual haredi
voices reveals that haredi yeshiva students consider their Torah studies to be an integral
component to Israel’s wartime activities. Contrary to the expectations of this thesis,
haredi resistance to military service is not defined by an aversion to war or a commitment
to peace, and it therefore cannot serve as a model for advocates of conflict resolution to
emulate.
ii
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Chapter One
–

Introduction
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), charged with maintaining the security of Israeli
citizens, has a glorious and complex history of repelling enemy attacks from outside
Israel’s borders and neutralizing security threats from within. The method by which it
fills its ranks is military conscription. While conscription is not a popular policy in many
parts of the Western world, in Israel it has evolved into a powerful socializing instrument
for shaping national identity. It is the product of historical consciousness, where the idea
of survival is ingrained within every individual. Since its independence in 1948, Israel
has engaged in numerous military conflicts. From the War of Independence (1947-1949),
where the number of deaths exceeded 6,000, to the 1967 War (776 deaths), the War of
Attrition (1968-1970: 1,424 deaths), the 1973 War (2,688 deaths), the First Lebanon War
(1982-1985: 1,216 deaths), the Second Intifada (2000-2005: 328 deaths), the Second
Lebanon War (2006: 117 deaths), and finally Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009: 10
deaths), the State of Israel has lost a large proportion of its population to war.1 As the
Jewish population of Israel is 5.59 million people, these battle casualties are a stark
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Jewish Virtual Library, “Israeli Casualties in Battle;” available from http://www.jewish
virtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/casualty_table.html; Internet; accessed 1 March 2009.
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reminder of the extreme costs that Israel accrues during violent conflicts.2 In spite of
these risks, most 18-year-old Jewish Israelis willingly enlist in the IDF.

IDF Conscription
The national conscription guidelines in Israel are as follows: all Jewish Israelis,
male and female, are required to enlist in the IDF at the age of 18. After a period of
regular duty (for men: 36 months, and for women: 21 months), all Jewish Israeli males
serve up to 39 days per year in reserve duty until the age of 51.3 In addition to Jewish
Israeli conscripts, the IDF drafts male members of Israel’s Druze and Circassian
communities, whose numbers range in the hundreds. Male members of Israel’s Bedouin
communities, as well as a few select Israeli Arab Christians, may volunteer for IDF
service. They are accepted on a case-by-case basis. These conscription guidelines allow
the IDF to field a force of 176,500 regulars on active duty and 445,000 in reserve,
totaling 621,500 available soldiers.4
In recent time, the number of draft-age Jewish Israeli males who do not serve in
the military has been growing. In 1980, the level of non-service was 12.1 percent; in
1990, it was 16.6 percent; and in 2002, it was 23.9 percent. Of the 25 percent of draft-age
Jewish Israeli males who did not serve in the IDF in 2007, 4 percent were residing abroad
2

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel Celebrates 61 Years of Independence,” 27 April 2009; available
from http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2009/Israel_celebrates_61_years_independenc
e_28-Apr-2009.htm; Internet; accessed 23 May 2009.
3

Jewish Virtual Library, “Israel Defense Forces (IDF) – An Introduction;” available from http://www.
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/IDF.html; Internet; accessed 19 February 2009.
4

The Institute for National Security Studies, “Middle East Military Balance,” 11; available from
http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1206270841.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 February 2009.
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when receiving their call to duty; 3 per cent possessed a criminal record; 2 percent
suffered from a physical incapacity or premature death; and 5 percent displayed a
‘psychological incompatibility,’ a softer term for ‘draft-dodging.’ The remaining 11
percent of draft-age Jewish Israeli males who did not serve are ultra-Orthodox haredi
yeshiva students.5

Research Question
The purpose of the following research is to unravel the specific motivations of
this final group of Jewish Israelis for avoiding military service. In short, this research
question asks why haredi yeshiva students choose not to serve in the IDF. In an attempt
to answer this research question, this thesis will test three hypotheses: first, haredi
yeshiva students simply do not want to serve in the IDF. Historical, social and communal
motives justify the rejection of service in state institutions such as the military. While the
haredim want to enjoy living in the state, they refuse to defend it. Second, ultra-Orthodox
yeshiva students advocate peace. They oppose wars and reject all forms of violence.
Rejecting service in the IDF is a political gesture to demonstrate pacifism. Third, Jewish
religious law clearly forbids Jews to engage in violence conflict. Strictly observant
yeshiva students cannot subject themselves to service in an institution that is violent by
its very nature. Judaism and militarism are simply irreconcilable. Ultimately, are IDF
deferments for ultra-Orthodox haredi yeshiva students the product of a moral and/or
spiritual conviction to avoid violent conflict, or the product of a motivation that seeks to
5

Stuart A. Cohen, “The False ‘Crisis’ in Military Recruitment: An IDF Red Herring,” The Begin/Sadat
Center for Strategic Studies, Perspectives Paper No. 33, 23 July 2007; available from http://www.biu.ac
.il/Besa/perspectives33.html; Internet; accessed 19 February 2009.
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maximize their communal and social gain at the expense of sending other Israeli Jews to
engage in violent conflict?
Viewed from a macro perspective, this research is both grounded in the field of
conflict resolution and directly related to the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For
example, military conscription in Israel is, in and of itself, a conflict resolution
mechanism. As will be explained later in this thesis, one of the founders’ primary
motivations for introducing military conscription at the outset of the State of Israel was to
create a civic institution capable of transcending the ethnic and cultural cleavages that
existed within the immigrating Jewish Diaspora. Israel’s founders regarded the military
as an instrument that would dilute the differences that existed among the newly arrived
Jewish Israelis and give birth to an overarching sense of national identity. The same logic
persists to this day; instead of exacerbating competing identities, military conscription in
Israel serves to assuage conflicting needs and interests by instilling a sense of collective
values and common ideals.
While military conscription serves to fashion a national Israeli identity, it also
functions as Israel’s principal means of managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For
better or worse, Israel’s most frequent attempts at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict involve the military. As such, it must field a massive military apparatus in order
to address this conflict, and military conscription is a method that ensures that the
military is never lacking for personnel. Through military conscription, Israel is always
prepared to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, regardless of how great a sacrifice of
its citizenry is necessary.

4

In spite of the nationalizing effects of military conscription, the ultra-Orthodox
haredi segments of Israeli society remain largely unaffected. For reasons examined in
subsequent chapters of this thesis, Israel’s haredi communities have traditionally resisted
the trends of popular Jewish Israeli culture in favor of a cloistered lifestyle and
vociferously denounced what they perceived as the secularizing tide of contemporary
Israeli society. With this information in mind, Israel’s founders publicly agreed to exempt
a specified number of haredi yeshiva students from military conscription so that they
could dedicate all of their energy to reviving the ultra-Orthodox haredi religious
traditions that had almost been completely decimated by the Holocaust. Yet privately, the
founders acquiesced to this arrangement in order to secure the silence of the haredi
leaders who adamantly objected to the notion of Israeli statehood. Thus, the policy of
haredi yeshiva student military exemptions began as a method of conflict prevention and
mitigation. Had Israel’s leaders refused to make this concession, they would have most
certainly faced an extraordinarily high level of opposition to the establishment of the
State of Israel from the haredim, placing them not only in conflict with neighboring
Arabs and other anti-Zionists, but also with an important contingent of Palestinian Jewry.
At every escalation of the numbers of exempted haredim since then, Israel’s leaders
consented in part because they sought to avoid an inflammation of intra-Jewish conflict.
The policy of haredi yeshiva student exemptions, however, has not been without
consequences, as it affects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in two problematic areas. First,
the numbers of exempted haredi yeshiva students has skyrocketed to over 50,000 young
men, a staggeringly high proportion to the overall number of conscripted Jewish Israelis.
According to sources within the IDF, Israel’s military apparatus will encounter a
5

dangerously low level of troops if this policy is allowed to continue at its current pace.
Because Israel tends to utilize its military to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its
leaders could find themselves unable to defend the country and resolve the conflict if
exorbitant numbers of Jewish Israelis are increasingly allowed to forego military service.
Second, this policy unnecessarily adds tension to an already perilous conflict by pitting
Jews against Jews, thereby inhibiting the emergence of a united Jewish effort focused on
meaningfully addressing the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A large portion of Jewish
Israelis who willingly submit to military service take umbrage at the fact that a certain
social group in Israel is lawfully permitted to avoid military service. To these detractors,
a feeling exists that the Israeli government favors one segment of Jewish Israelis over the
rest of the population and sends the majority of Jewish Israelis into the battle to fight on
behalf of the haredim. As a result, a great animosity exists between the haredim and
mainstream Jewish society, which indirectly affects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by
hampering the chances that these very different demographic groups will come together
and agree to approach the conflict as an undivided Jewish front.
Due to the contentious nature of this policy, this research question will be
analyzed through the lens of three hypotheses that are wholly based in the field of
conflict resolution. The first hypothesis – that haredi yeshiva students do not serve in the
military because they simply do not want to – purports that haredi non-service is the
result of a personal aversion to conflict. In this scenario, haredi yeshiva students
individually disagree with Israel’s traditional method of conflict resolution – specifically,
a military solution – and do not want to be party to its violent tactics. Thus, by steering
clear of military service, they effectively avoid engaging in violent conflict. The second
6

hypothesis alleges that haredi yeshiva students avoid military service because they
project a pacifistic political ideology. They politically oppose all forms of violent
conflict, and their non-service is a political act intended to represent their opposition to
violent methods of conflict resolution in favor of a peaceful and diplomatic approach.
Violence, in this view, is at all times politically indefensible. The final hypothesis posits
that haredi yeshiva students justify their non-service on religious grounds. As ultraconservative adherents to the Jewish religious tradition, haredi yeshiva students are
religiously prohibited from participating in war and directed to find peaceful solutions to
potentially violent conflicts. From this argument, it follows that the Jewish people are not
warmongers, but are instead, representatives of peace. While these three hypotheses are
certainly not mutually exclusive, the examination of each one will offer an opportunity to
decipher the true motivations of these yeshiva students and thus submit the soundest and
most nuanced final judgment.
If there is truth to any of these hypotheses, they may represent a minor but
important shift away from aggressive Jewish Israeli attitudes toward the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. As was previously explained, each of these hypotheses assumes that
haredi yeshiva students avoid military service for a specific reason related to conflict
resolution. Should evidence surface that any of these justifications are legitimate, it
would necessarily cast Israel’s haredi communities in a favorable light. But what if these
pacifistic feelings and opinions are not exclusive to the haredim, but are merely more
apparent in these communities due to their military exemptions? What if haredi peaceful
perspectives are an indicator of wider social trends permeating Jewish Israeli society as a
whole? Do most young Jewish Israelis, for instance, wish to avoid engaging in the
7

violence that is indicative of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Would they rather spend
their time after high school in the pursuit of goals unrelated to the military? Do these
same youngsters hold pacifistic political viewpoints, and therefore support a peaceful
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? And are there traditional Jewish principles
that less religious Jewish Israelis can look to for guidance in resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict? To be sure, all of this is pure speculation, but the potential for
changing attitudes should not be ignored. If any of these hypotheses are true of haredi
motivations for not serving in the military, they may very well serve as a model for other
Jewish Israelis to emulate. At that point, the world may begin to witness a renewed
commitment to a peaceful resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

History of Haredi Yeshiva Student Exemptions
The military exemption of haredi yeshiva students has a long history. With the
impending invasion of Arab armies in 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister
of the State of Israel, consolidated the various Jewish underground militias into the IDF
and instituted a policy of national conscription to fill its ranks. As Jewish refugees from
Eastern Europe began pouring into the fledgling state, leaders of the ultra-Orthodox
communities pleaded with Ben-Gurion to exempt their most promising Torah scholars
from military service. These leaders, most notably the Hazon Ish and Rabbi Elazar
Schach, argued that the Holocaust had decimated the ultra-Orthodox communities, and
these communities were in desperate need of scholars to resuscitate their traditions. BenGurion acquiesced and permitted the exemption of 400 scholars who could avoid military

8

service and study in the yeshivas.6 Ben-Gurion’s reasoning for introducing this policy
was not, however, limited to his sympathy with the plight of the haredi communities.
True, Ben-Gurion recognized that the Holocaust had eradicated almost four-fifths of the
haredim in Eastern Europe, and he sincerely wanted to provide an environment in Israel
where they could restore their traditions.7 But Ben-Gurion was also a shrewd pragmatist.
He understood that the various segments of the haredi community shared an
overwhelming antipathy toward Zionism and the establishment of an independent Jewish
state through means other than the coming of the Messiah. In order to silence haredi
opposition to the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which
was deliberating over the future of Palestine in 1946, Ben-Gurion negotiated a number of
religious concessions with haredi leaders, one of which would eventually lead to the
exemption of 400 yeshiva students from IDF conscription.8
The total number of yeshiva exemptions was held at approximately 400 until
1975, when then Minister of Defense Shimon Peres raised the quota to 800. When the
Likud Party won its landmark electoral victory in 1977, its leaders convinced the haredi
political party, Agudat Israel, to join the governing coalition.9 Part of the coalition
agreement included a stipulation to eliminate the ceiling of yeshiva student exemptions
by broadening the criteria for exemption to include not only students for whom Torato

6

Nurit Stadler, “Playing with Sacred/Corporeal Identities: Yeshiva Students’ Fantasies of Military
Participation,” Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society 13, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 158.
7

Donna Rosenthal, The Israelis: Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Land (New York: Free Press,
2003), 176.
8

Stuart A. Cohen, Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion (New York: Routledge, 2008), 131.

9

Menachem Hofnung, “Ethnicity, Religion and Politics in Applying Israel’s Conscription Law,” Law and
Policy 17, no. 3 (July 1995): 324-325.
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Omanuto (“Torah is his profession”) applies but also ‘born-again’ – or newly religious –
Jews as well as teachers and graduates of the haredi independent school system.10 As a
result, haredi deferrals immediately increased to 8,257 in 1977.11 In the following
decades, the number of haredi deferrals exploded. In 1987, 17,017 draft-age yeshiva
students were deferred; 28,772 were deferred in 1997; and 41,450 yeshiva students were
deferred in 2005.12 In 2008, the number of deferred haredi yeshiva students skyrocketed
to 55,300.13 In terms of proportion to the overall pool of draft-age Jewish Israeli recruits,
deferred haredi yeshiva students accounted for 3.7 percent in 1980; 4.6 percent in 1990; 9
percent in 2000; and 11.2 percent in 2007.14 According to IDF officials, the rate of haredi
yeshiva student deferments will increase to 25 percent of all 18-year-old Jewish Israeli
males by the year 2020 if the policy continues at its current pace.15
The policy of haredi yeshiva student deferrals is based on Section 36(3) of the
Defense Service Law (1986). This law grants the Minister of Defense the authority to
grant deferrals to individuals, “…for reasons related to the size of the regular forces or
reserve forces of the Israel Defense Forces or for reasons related to the requirements of
10

Steven V. Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law: Religion and Democracy in the Jewish State (New York:
Lexington Books, 2006), 189.
11

Cohen, Israel and Its Army, 131.

12

Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law, 189.

13

Ilan Shahar, “More and More Yeshiva Students Choosing Torah over IDF Service,” Ha’aretz, 31 July
2008; available from http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1007085.html; Internet; accessed 19 February
2009.
14

Cohen, “The False ‘Crisis’” and Hanan Greenberg, “Barak Refuses to Exempt 1,000 Haredim from IDF
Service,” YnetNews.com, 6 March 2008; available from http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3515582,00.html; Internet; accessed 4 May 2009.
15

Ilan Shahar, “Only 80 Yeshiva Students Opted for National Service in the Past Year,” Ha’aretz, 5 June
2008; available from http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/990516.html; Internet; accessed 25 February
2009.
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education, security, settlement or the national economy or for family or other reasons.”16
The yeshiva student receives his military service deferral in the following way: when he
reaches the age of conscription, he must obtain a recommendation for deferral from the
head of his yeshiva and then submit an annual application for deferment to the Minster of
Defense, who then approves the request on a case-by-case basis. 17 If the applicant is
enrolled in full-time yeshiva study, his application is normally approved. After the haredi
yeshiva student has been successfully deferred for a number of years, he eventually
reaches an age for which the conscription guidelines no longer apply. At this point, he
achieves a permanent exemption from military service.18
For almost four decades, the policy of yeshiva student deferment has been
challenged in Israel’s Supreme Court. Beginning with Becker v. Minister of Defense
(1970), most cases were dismissed on the basis that the petitioners had no standing to
come before the court.19 Nevertheless, the Court’s refusal to rule on this matter changed
on December 9, 1998, when the Court issued its judgment concerning Rubinstein v.
Minister of Defense. Writing on behalf of the unanimous opinion of the Court, President
of the Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, ruled:
Although the Court has upheld the administrative arrangement in the past,
relying on a statutory provision authorizing the Defense Minister to grant
exemptions “for other reasons,” the growing number of students covered
by the exemption has pushed it beyond his authority…At a certain point,

16

Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law, 189.

17

Israel Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel: New Edition (London: Pluto
Press, 2004), 29.
18

Hofnung, “Ethnicity, Religion and Politics,” 324.

19

Ibid., 325.
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quantity becomes quality. The Defense Minister’s current practice of
granting deferrals and exemptions is invalid.20
With this ruling, the Court declared this practice, which had existed since the earliest
days of the Jewish state, illegal. It did not, however, provide any recommendations to
remedy the situation. Instead, it directed the Knesset to convene and propose new
legislation. Barak concluded:
The Defense Minister or the Knesset should be allowed to conduct a
serious and organized discussion regarding the entire issue and all of its
ramifications…We must postpone the impat [sic] of our decision. With
respect to our authority to do so…we have reached the conclusion that the
appropriate period of postponement is twelve months from the day this
judgment is rendered, i.e. until December 9, 1999.21
Nearly nine months later, on August 23, 1999, then Prime Minster Ehud Barak tapped
retired Justice Zvi Tal to preside over a ten-person commission, assembled to draft new
legislation concerning yeshiva deferrals and present it to the Knesset.22

The Tal Law
As the Tal Commission deliberated, the IDF began to take steps of its own to
integrate young haredi males into the military. In consultation with haredi rabbis, Major
General Yehuda Segev, then Commanding Officer of the IDF’s Manpower Branch,
launched Battalion 97, or the Netzach Yehuda Battalion, in 1999.23 Commonly known as
Nahal Haredi, this battalion is a segregated unit that allows young haredi men to

20

Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense, H.C. 3267/97, 715/98 (1998), 2.

21

Ibid., 65.

22

Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law, 190.

23

Cohen, Israel and Its Army, 133.
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participate in military activities while remaining true to their religious requirements.
Nahal’s website advertises the battalion’s mission statement, stating that the regiment
offers,
To provide for the unique spiritual needs of Haredi [sic] youth, while also
enabling them to participate in the defense of Israel…To provide these
young men with the educational and professional qualifications needed to
achieve economic independence…To provide the Haredi [sic] community
with a unique opportunity to share the nation’s military burden as well as
bridging the social gap between the secular and religious populations in
Israel.24
In accordance with ultra-Orthodox religious practice, Nahal soldiers are protected from
contact with female soldiers, afforded daily opportunities for prayer and Torah study,
and allowed contact with their community rabbis.25 During their period of enlistment,
some Nahal soldiers serve in combat units, while others perform religious functions for
the IDF such as ensuring kosher standards and administering death rituals.26 Despite its
establishment, Nahal Haredi did not become a viable option for haredi youths until the
Tal Commission presented its proposal, and even then, it was met with limited success.
In March 2000, the Tal Commission delivered its conclusions. Its report began by
recommending that yeshiva student deferrals continue without a ceiling. These deferrals
did, however, include a stipulation. Although 18-year-old yeshiva students would remain
deferred, the Tal Commission recommended that these students take an optional ‘decision
year’ upon reaching the age of 22. During this year, yeshiva students would be free to
24

Nahal Haredi, “Mission Statement;” available from http://www.nahalharedi.org/nahal_haredi_mission
_statement.php; Internet; accessed 4 April 2009.
25

Cohen, Israel and Its Army, 132-133 and Nurit Stadler, Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari,
“Fundamentalism’s Encounters with Citizenship: the Haredim in Israel,” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 3 (June
2008): 222.
26

Stadler, “Fundamentalism’s Encounters,” 221-222.
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enter the labor market or enroll in educational or vocational training without fear of being
conscripted. After the decision year, yeshiva students could choose from one of three
options. First, these haredim could return to their yeshivas and remain deferred. Second,
they could enlist in the IDF for a reduced term of service for four months, after which
they would serve in the reserves, thus making them eligible to legally pursue
employment. Third, they could volunteer for one year of civil service, such as in
paramedic and firefighting units or in local departments of social services, which would
also permit them to work and free them from the prospects of being drafted.27 Two years
later, in July 2002, the Knesset passed the Tal Commission’s proposal by a vote of 51 in
favor, 41 opposed, 5 abstentions and 22 absent, allowing the new law a five-year trial
period.28
Following the ratification of the Tal Law, a large bloc consisting of the Movement
for Quality Government, the Meretz and Shinui political parties, and private attorney
Yehuda Ressler, presented petitions to the Supreme Court, alleging that the law violated
Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. This bloc argued that the Tal Law
contravened the Basic Law’s principle of equality by forcing the majority of Jewish
Israelis to bear the burden of military service while allowing the haredi communities to
avoid service altogether. Four years later, the Court rejected these petitions. Supreme
Court President Barak stated:

27

Dan Izenberg, “Halutz Opposes Court Ruling on Tal Law,” Jerusalem Post, 11 May 2006; available
from http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1145961322633;
Internet; accessed 5 May 2009 and Matthew Wagner, “Tal Law Implementation Days Away,” Jerusalem
Post, 2 July 2007; available from http://www.jpost.com/servlet.Satellite?cid=1183053087104&pagename
=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull; Internet; accessed 5 May 2009.
28

Cohen, Israel and Its Army, 132.
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Alongside our decision that the petitions are rejected, because at this point
in time we cannot determine that the law is unconstitutional, there is
reason for concern that the Military Deferment Law [as it is formally
named] will become unconstitutional. Indeed, our ruling today is that the
Military Deferment Law is not yet unconstitutional, but there is cause for
concern that it will become so unless there is a significant improvement in
the results it has achieved [so far] in practice.29
Even though the Court ruled that the Tal Law was not unconstitutional, it nevertheless
admitted that the law did, in fact, violate the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
They deemed that this discrepancy was tolerable because the Tal Law was “…for a
worthy purpose and in keeping with the values of Israel as a Jewish and democratic
state.”30 Moreover, the Court admonished both the IDF and the government for failing to
provide adequate and attractive options to haredi yeshiva students who wanted to take the
decision year. The Court concluded its opinion by threatening to terminate the law by the
end of its trial period if it did not produce evidence of demonstrable progress.31
By mid-July 2007, the Tal Law had yielded mixed results. Many haredi yeshiva
students had chosen to take the decision year. Yet, their numbers were a small fraction of
the overall draft-age pool of haredi males. As of December 9, 2005, the state reported
that 1,432 yeshiva students took the decision year, and only 618 of those students
participated for the entire year. A mere 74 yeshiva students chose to join the army and
103 chose civil service.32 In 2007, the number of haredim who joined the IDF was only
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353.33 Despite these numbers, Nahal Haredi currently reports that the battalion consists
of almost 1,000 soldiers.34 According to other sources, this number is misleading,
because more than half of this number is composed of national-religious soldiers who
joined Nahal because they were “…attracted by its more stringently orthodox
ambience.”35 Despite these diminutive numbers, the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and
Defense Committee recommended that the Tal Law be extended by five more years. On
July 18, 2007, the Knesset approved this extension by a vote of 56 in favor, 9 opposed
and 2 abstentions.36
In closing, a word from David Ben-Gurion is appropriate. Ten years after he
granted the first 400 military exemptions to haredi yeshiva students, he had second
thoughts. In 1958, he wrote:
After the founding of the state, the sages came to me and told me: all
centers of learning in the Diaspora were destroyed and this is the only
country where some yeshivot were left. There are only a handful of
students, so they should be exempted from military service. I considered
their request…and gave orders to exempt yeshiva students. Things have
changed since then: there are many religious students here and
abroad…The mother who lost her son may say: maybe if there had been
more soldiers with my boy, he would not have died…I suggest that you
reconsider this matter. We do not wish to see the destruction of the Third
Temple.37
Concomitantly,
33

Nehemia Shtrasler, “IDF Proposes Replacement to Tal Lawl; PM Expresses Support,” Ha’aretz, 13 May
2007; available from http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/858896.html; Internet; accessed 5 May 2009.
34

Nahal Haredi, “Background about Nahal Haredi;” available from http://www.nahalharedi.org/back
ground_about_nahal_haredi.php; Internet; accessed 4 April 2009.
35

Cohen, Israel and Its Army, 133.

36

Amnon Meranda, “Knesset Extends Tal Law by 5 Years,” YnetNews.com, 18 July 2007; available from
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3427136,00.html; Internet; accessed 5 May 2009.
37

Hofnung, “Ethnicity, Religion and Politics,” 324.

16

Studies have indicated that, in Jewish communities in the past (especially
among East European Jewish communities), only a handful of prodigies,
members of a select elite, dedicated their lives to the pursuit of
knowledge.38
Why, then, are haredi yeshiva students avoiding military service in contemporary Israel
in record numbers?

Methodology
This thesis employs a historical/policy evaluative methodology to analyze the
strengths and weaknesses of the hypotheses. This particular methodology was chosen for
two primary reasons: first, it is necessary to assess the extent to which the policy of
haredi yeshiva student military exemptions has or has not deviated from the beliefs and
goals of the leading actors who instituted it more the fifty years ago. If it has strayed from
their original intentions, this methodology will help determine what factors forced this
policy away from following its projected track. In so doing, this methodology will clarify
how the three variables laid out in the hypotheses – personal motives, political views and
religious observance – have shaped the trajectory of this policy, for better or for worse.
Second, this methodology will provide the opportunity to pinpoint what, if any, political,
social and cultural ramifications this policy has introduced to the Israeli body politic. If
the effects of this policy are minimal, this methodology will help explain how the policy
has been smoothly and amenably integrated into contemporary Israeli society. If,
however, this policy has engendered controversy and resistance, this methodology will
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present a chance to consider the ways in which this policy contributes to intra-Jewish
conflict in the State of Israel.
The data collected for this thesis are both extensive and diverse, comprising a
literature review, online newspaper articles, official State of Israel statistics and unofficial
public opinion surveys. The literature review touches on such issues as civil-military
relations, the nature and structure of the IDF, Jewish religious tradition, Israel’s ultraOrthodox haredi communities, and conscientious objection in Israel. Although several
authors are reviewed, three specific authors deserve special attention for their
contribution to this thesis. Nurit Stadler, senior lecturer at the Department of Sociology
and Anthropology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, provides a rare and muchneeded perspective of haredi views of military service. Her specialization in the fields of
religious fundamentalism and ultra-Orthodoxy in Israel shines in the such essays as,
“Fundamentalism’s Encounters with Citizenship: the Haredim in Israel,” “Other-Worldly
Soldiers? Ultra-Orthodox Views of Military Service in Israel,” and “Playing with
Sacred/Corporeal Identities: Yeshiva Students’ Fantasies of Military Participation.”
Moreover, Stuart A. Cohen, Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University and
Chair of the academic council of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, offers a
valuable and unbiased appraisal of the relationship between the IDF and Israeli society as
well as IDF manpower policies in his publications entitled, “The False ‘Crisis’ in Military
Recruitment: An IDF Red Herring,” “Tensions Between Military Service and Jewish
Orthodoxy in Israel: Implications Imagined and Real,” and Israel and Its Army: From
Cohesion to Confusion. Finally, Menachem Friedman, Emeritus Professor of Sociology
at Bar-Ilan University, utilizes his expertise in the fields of secularization and
18

confrontation between religious and non-religious Jewish groups and the processes of
extremism and zealotry to present a pointed and unique portrait of haredi views of
conflict and violence. His essays, “Haredi Violence in Contemporary Society” and
“Haredim and Palestinians in Jerusalem,” are unmatched in their originality and attention
to detail. Without the insights of these authors, this thesis would have had tremendous
difficulty getting off of the ground.
In addition to the literature review, online Israeli newspaper articles provided upto-date opinions and statistics. Three well-read and respected online Israeli newspapers,
Ynetnews, The Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz, provided the bulk of these articles.
Ynetnews is the online English version of Israel’s most popular newspaper, Yedioth
Ahronoth, and it is a largely independent/moderate newspaper that provides both left- and
right-wing views. The reports from one of its journalists, Hanan Greenberg, offer the
opinions of non-haredi Israelis regarding the policy of haredi military deferrals. In
addition, The Jerusalem Post, a historically conservative newspaper, presents its readers
with new developments in this policy debate, including strong coverage of recent
government decisions concerning the Tal Law. Lastly, Ha’aretz, recognized as Israel’s
liberal media outlet, submits current statistics on haredi yeshiva student military deferrals
and conveys an anti-Tal Law sentiment through one of its reporters, Ilan Shahar. Taken
together, the reportage of these newspapers complements the literature review by adding
a ‘breaking news’ dimension to this policy debate.
Many of the statistics central to this thesis were gathered from official State of
Israel websites. The websites for the Knesset, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Central Bureau of Statistics provided much-needed demographic and political data.
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Other statistics, such as information regarding the military capabilities and manpower
make-up of the IDF, were provided by the websites of Nahal Haredi and the Institute for
National Security Studies. Supplementary statistics were provided by Stuart A. Cohen’s
study, “The False ‘Crisis’ in Military Recruitment: An IDF Red Herring,” which was
sponsored by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. In this invaluable essay,
Cohen supplies the current rates of non-service of non-haredi young Israeli males as well
as the proportion of haredi non-enlistment to the overall draft-age Jewish Israeli male
population over the past three decades.
Beyond statistics, public opinion surveys constitute a considerable portion of this
research. These surveys were used to determine the political attitudes of the haredi
communities in Israel vis-à-vis the conflict with the Palestinians and to highlight the
political differences between the haredim and other non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups in
Israel. The most comprehensive surveys come from the Institute for National Security
Studies, which produces an annual compendium of Israeli public opinion on national
security. The surveys from 2001, 2003 and 2005-2007 offer detailed summaries of Israeli
public opinion based on a sliding scale of religious observance, from those who observe
all Jewish religious traditions (ultra-Orthodox) to those who practice no Jewish religious
traditions (secular). The findings from all surveys utilized in this thesis will provide an
occasion to analyze the extent to which Israel’s haredi communities advocate either an
escalation or a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More significantly, these
findings will make it possible to judge how these political opinions correlate with the
general haredi practice of avoiding military service and what this may mean for Jewish
Israeli social harmony.
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Chapter Two
–

The Significance of IDF Service
A thorough examination of the phenomenon of mass IDF deferrals for ultraOrthodox yeshiva students would be incomplete without a brief discussion of the role that
the IDF plays in modern Israeli society. This chapter explores the nature of civil-military
relations in Israel and focuses primarily on the significance of obligatory military service
for Israel’s Jewish population, especially as it relates to the development of a collective
national identity. It then analyzes the potential negative consequences of non-service in
terms of social mobility and economic development. Moreover, it attempts to gauge the
reaction of non-haredi Jewish Israelis to this policy of mass IDF deferrals for ultraOrthodox yeshiva students. Finally, this chapter concludes by providing an in-depth
analysis of the level of conflict engendered among the disparate Jewish elements of
Israeli society as a by-product of this policy of haredi non-enlistment.

Dawn of National Conscription
When the Jewish leaders of the Yishuv declared independence for the State of
Israel in 1948, they did so, in part, to attract the global Jewish Diaspora to immigrate to
the nascent Jewish state. As was the case then and now, the various communities of the
Jewish Diaspora constituted a veritable ‘melting-pot’ of identities, cultures and values.
Upon arrival to the Jewish state, these immigrant communities did not shed their
21

distinguishing characteristics, but they instead entrenched themselves among similar
immigrants and created sub-communities within the fledgling Israeli polity.
Consequently, the various communities of the early Jewish state shared few common
traits with each other, except, of course, for their Jewish ethnicity and/or religious
practices.
While the Jewish communities of the early Jewish state possessed few
commonalities, they nevertheless found themselves drawn together in defense of the
nation during their war for independence in 1948. Because the attacking Arab armies
vastly outnumbered the Jewish population in 1948, it was incumbent upon the majority of
the newly minted Israeli Jews to join ranks and contribute to the defense effort.
This first major violent conflict for the State of Israel provided Israeli leaders with
the opportunity to integrate Israel’s various Jewish communities into an inclusive
collective. When Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion established the policy of universal
conscription for the IDF, his reasoning surpassed the basic need to gather fighters to
defend the young nation during its war for independence. From the outset, Ben-Gurion
believed that few other national institutions could more successfully integrate the
disparate Jewish communities into Israeli society than the military. He wrote:
Our soldier is first and foremost a citizen, in the fullest meaning of that
term. A citizen belonging to his [or her] homeland, to the history of the
nation, its culture and language…[The military] is the state institution
where all cleavages: ethnic, political, class-based or of any other sort,
vanish. Each soldier is equal to his companion in status.39

39

Ayelet Shachar, “Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity,” in From Migrants to Citizens:
Membership in a Changing World, ed. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 416.

22

More than sixty years later, Ben-Gurion’s statement still carries weight. As will be shown
later in this chapter, military service in Israel has not only served to integrate the various
Jewish communities in Israel, but it has also come to be defined as the Jewish Israeli’s
most sacred civic duty, conferring upon those who serve with a range of rights and
privileges.

Civil-Military Relations in Israel
Before moving to the discussion about the significance of military service in
Israel, it is important to note that Ben-Gurion’s reasoning about the integrative nature of
military service was by no means novel. To be sure, Ben-Gurion drew on the historical
lesson that wars and military service have a binding effect on societies, idealized in both
William James’ notion that, “[wars are] the gory nurse that trained societies to
cohesiveness,” and Hegel’s assertion that military service is the, “ultimate expression of
the individual’s recognition of his membership [in] the ethical community of the state.”40
In his book, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship,
Ronald R. Krebs explores the notion that a nation’s military generates powerful
expressions of the citizens’ collective allegiance to, and ownership of, the state. He
contends that, through military service, citizens of the state gather together and discover
through their aggregate efforts that they are equal and integral parts of an undertaking
much greater than their distinct communities.
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The armed forces…bring together individuals of various backgrounds in
common cause and in a collaborative spirit, providing a setting seemingly
well-suited to breaking down dividing lines based on race, ethnicity,
religion, or class…[and] they…emerge cognizant that they [are]
constitutive pieces of a larger project.41
While serving in the military, individuals come into contact with myriad ethnicities and
cultures, but instead of exacerbating these differences, the military fosters a new set of
values to which every individual soldier can ascribe. Shared military service during times
of war and peace allows individuals to transcend identity cleavages and realize a new
sense of belonging – membership in a greater collective that is the nation.
From the time of Israel’s war for independence, Israel’s existence has been
defined by conflict, from large-scale wars to low-intensity struggles. In fact,
Israel has been involved in more wars since World War II than any other
country in the world. Some Israelis perceive the brief history of their state
as one long war punctuated by occasional cease-fires and lulls in acts of
terrorism.42
In a country roughly the size of New Jersey, few Israeli Jews have been able to find
respite from the effects of frequent violent conflict. Unfortunately for Israeli Jews, many
have come to perceive their country in terms of this well-known mantra: “all citizens are
soldiers and the entire state is the front line.”43
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Social and Economic Aspects of Military Service
As mentioned previously, military service in Israel is considered the most sacred
civic obligation. There is no greater duty than sacrificing one’s life in defense of the state.
Consequently, IDF service confers enormous advantages to those individuals who present
themselves to the state. In many ways, IDF service defines an individual’s status within
Israeli society. Asher Arian notes that this status-building can start as early as
adolescence, as teenagers begin to dream about the military unit in which they wish to
serve.44 Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur further this argument by writing that the
most valuable opportunities for employment and higher education come only to those
Israelis who have dedicated a significant portion of their adult lives to IDF service.45
Myron J. Aronoff even goes as far as claiming that families and communities whose
members suffer a high proportion of casualties during military service are elevated to a
higher status within society.46 Indeed, it would not be hyperbole to claim that IDF service
is the most indispensable tool for achieving upward mobility within Israeli society.
Since the IDF has an official policy of universal conscription, it would seem that
every Israeli has the same opportunity to achieve success and stature in Israeli society.
However, as has been explained, there are many social and ethnic groups in Israel that do
not share in the burden of military service. While these groups certainly enjoy the benefit
of not having to risk losing their lives during war, their non-service has worked to place

44

Arian, “Vox Populi,” 129.

45

Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur, “Civil-Military Relations in Israel at the Outset of the Twenty-First
Century,” in Jews in Israel: Contemporary Social and Cultural Patterns, ed. Uzi Rebhun and Chaim I.
Waxman (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2004), 334.
46

Aronoff, “Wars as Catalysts,” 42.

25

them at the margins of society, allowing those Israelis who do serve to question their
dedication to, or merit for, membership in the state.47 Ayelet Shachar writes,
In a country like Israel, where identity and group membership matter
significantly and where wars and armed confrontations are still, for
various exogenous and endogenous reasons, a real threat, military service
has become an obvious demarcating tool for distinguishing between
members of the same polity – that is, between those who truly belong to
the republic and those who are entitled to the rights of citizenship in the
state but are conceived as less than full members of the political
community because they do not partake in its most fundamental
expressions of self-determination, that is, military service.48
By not fulfilling this most sacred civic duty of military service, the groups who do not
serve are generally relegated to the Israeli social periphery. In this position, they find
themselves at a distinct disadvantage in terms of equality of opportunity.
The most profound consequence of non-service is economic. By and large, Jewish
Israelis who do not serve in the IDF are denied employment opportunities in both the
public and private sectors.49 For the haredi yeshiva students who receive deferments from
the IDF, options to generate income are limited. According to Matthew Wagner, a
journalist for the Jerusalem Post, Jewish men are forbidden by law from seeking
employment until they have served in the army, have reached the age of forty-one, or
have fathered five children by the age of thirty-one.50 While Wagner also reports that
many haredi yeshiva students work within the black market haredi community, this
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income is barely enough to provide for one individual, let alone the large families that are
characteristic of the haredi community.51
A few statistics will illustrate the dismal economic situation of Israel’s haredi
community. Haredi households have an average of 7.7 children, and sixty percent of the
heads of these households (the haredi male population, aged 25-54) does not work at all
due to full-time yeshiva studies.52 In order to cope with this economic situation, the state
pays for at least seventy percent of haredi families’ total income.53 Government stipends
for yeshiva students account for half of this income (a meager $200 per month in 1997),
and the remainder comes from state-subsidized child allowances.54 Even with these
welfare benefits, the haredi economic situation is dire: over half of the haredi population
falls below the poverty line.55 While their lowly economic status is not wholly a byproduct of non-service – for some haredim refuse to work in any environment associated
with Zionism – it is difficult to dispute the argument that their refusal to participate in the
IDF is directly correlated to haredi economic distress.

Grievances against Haredi Yeshiva Student Exemptions
The effects of the marginalization of those who do not serve in the IDF are not
simply economic. To be sure, the policy of haredi yeshiva student deferrals has generated
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a major social conflict between the haredi communities and the rest of Jewish Israeli
society, or as Steven V. Mazie has described, “a worsening Kulturkampf.”56 Part of this
conflict arises out of the fact that military service places an immeasurable burden on IDF
recruits. Drafted at the age of eighteen for an initial period of three years, soldiers are
essentially deprived of three of the most formative years of their lives. While most
eighteen-year-olds are leaving home for college or entering the job market for the first
time, these Jewish Israelis embark on a path that will expose them to violence and death.
Furthermore, after their initial service, IDF recruits devote several weeks per year to
reserve duty until their mid-fifties. As such, “[reserve] soldiers experience enormous
difficulties in their family lives, academic training, and especially their careers.”57
Due to this immense burden, IDF recruits and reservists have voiced two primary
grievances against the policy of deferred military service for haredi yeshiva students.
Their first objection is related to the economic situation of the haredim. Many IDF
soldiers cannot fathom why haredi communities receive such an enormous amount of
financial support from the state when they do not participate in the state’s most
fundamental civic duty. According to Nurit Stadler and Eyal Ben-Ari, this grievance is
rooted in the idea of citizenship and the equitable distribution of civic responsibilities.
“The [h]aredi community is criticized for accumulating state resources without evincing
a willingness to bear their share of collective duties. These stances have often been
formulated in terms of the [h]aredim being ‘parasites’ of the state…”58 The degree of
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IDF soldiers’ frustration at this trend is observable in one of the interviews conducted by
Donna Rosenthal for her book, The Israelis: Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Land.
One of her interviewees, Tamir, a teenage soldier on active duty, expressed his irritation
in powerful terms:
They’re draft evaders. It’s disgusting, unfair…We feel betrayed. Instead of
‘One People, One Draft,’ we carry their load, protecting them and
supporting them and their enormous families…If they don’t want to share
the burden, they should leave the country.59
From the perspective of the soldier, his/her service is an indispensable component of
protecting the existence of an Israeli society where the haredim are free to practice their
lifestyle. That the haredim are predominantly exempt from service leads soldiers to
question the legitimacy of the state’s reasoning for continuing to provide physical and
financial support for these communities. Thus, the IDF soldier might argue that only
through military service may an Israeli be allowed to enjoy the full social and material
benefits of the state.
The second grievance of IDF soldiers is related to the aforementioned maxim that
defines the state as the front line of defense in times of war. Because violence permeates
every facet of Israeli life, most Israelis believe that they serve not only to ensure the
continued existence of the State of Israel but also to protect their families and loved ones
from harm. In this respect, military service becomes a deeply personal issue. Jewish
Israelis accept their military service because it directly contributes to the safety and
wellbeing of the people to whom they are closest. Hence, Jewish Israeli soldiers take
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exception to the haredi communities’ rejection of military service. To these soldiers, it
may seem that the haredim exploit the willingness of the vast majority of Israeli Jews to
serve by staying home, thereby avoiding the effects of violent conflict. From this
perspective, the proverbial give-and-take of military service is deeply flawed; most
Jewish Israelis sacrifice their lives to the state while most haredim unjustly enjoy the
protective benefits of Israel’s robust military apparatus.
The voices of resentment toward the haredi avoidance of military service emanate
from a wide range of sectors in Jewish Israeli society, from both right- and left-wing
political parties and secular and non-haredi religious segments. For instance, Yosef
Lapid, former Knesset Member of the Shinui Party, railed against this policy, exclaiming,
“And what is this exemption of…yeshiva students from military service, but the trade in
the blood of secular youngsters…a cynical, corrupt, and offensive trade in the lives of our
children.”60 Moreover, Captain Gil Bickel, a deputy battalion commander in the IDF
reserves, protested this policy by handing in his military rank and officer’s ID. He
proclaimed, “I won’t serve in the reserves any longer and if I am called up, I would rather
be locked up…so many [haredi] citizens shirk their service, without any justification and
without any consideration from the military in terms of distributing the load equally.”61
Most interestingly, one particular haredi rabbi is known to have opposed this
policy. Rabbi Shlomo Yosef “Rav” Zevin makes a compelling argument against haredi
yeshiva student exemptions very much in line with his secular counterparts. He begins his
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statement by taking a jab at those haredi yeshiva students who do not serve. “Will you
send your brothers to war, and yourselves sit at home...Is your blood redder than
theirs?”62 Zevin then poses a hypothetical question, asking haredi yeshiva students what
they would do if every person was a yeshiva scholar and there was no IDF to provide for
defense. “Would we allow our enemies to ravage our land and kill our people without
taking up arms to defend ourselves?”63 Zevin concludes his statement by summoning one
of his halachic sources that commands everyone to contribute to defense during wartime.
“All go out to fight, even the bridegroom from his chamber and the bride from her
chuppah.”64 In essence, Zevin’s remarks aim to push haredi yeshiva students to look
inward and examine the value that they place on their families and communities. Is there
more intrinsic value on Torah studies than on physical safety? Must Torah scholars
acquiesce in the face of violence and subject themselves to the actions of attacking
armies? Although these are difficult questions to penetrate, the following chapters will
attempt to reveal a detailed response by analyzing the various motivations for nonservice, from traditional religious commandments to moral precepts of non-violence.

Conscientious Objectors
Related to the mass deferment of haredi yeshiva students from military service is
the growing phenomenon among other less religious Jewish Israelis who either invoke
their right to conscientious objection by refusing to obey military orders in certain
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situations or resist the IDF draft altogether. This particular trend began to gain steam
during the al-Aqsa Intifada as growing numbers of Jewish Israelis objected to the manner
in which their government responded to the mounting unrest in the Occupied
Territories.65 Emerging from this political indignation were four groups: Yesh Gvul,
Courage to Refuse, New Profile, and Shministim. While these groups differ in their modi
operandi, they are united by their opposition to Israel’s policy in the Occupied Territories
as well as by their conviction that individual Jewish Israelis possess the right to refuse
military service. Moreover, their existence is made possible by the creeping changes
taking place in the relationship between military service and civilian life in Israel.
Whereas in the past, military service in Israel was directly related to the social standing of
the individual, its effect on some demographic groups’ ability to flourish in the business
and political realm has since ebbed. Unlike the haredim, these protest groups belong to
the middle and upper Ashkenazi classes of Israeli society. As such, their potential for
upward mobility in Israeli society is less dependent on their military record than the poor
and ethnic elements of Israeli society who rely on military service to enhance their status
in the Israeli body politic.66
In addition to the waning relationship between military service and civilian life,
repeated IDF debacles – i.e. the government’s failure to foresee the outbreak of the 1973
Yom Kippur War and the IDF’s disastrous invasions and subsequent occupation of
Lebanon – have led segments of Israeli society to challenge openly the pervasiveness of
the IDF in civil society. These segments object to the prioritization of military values in
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contemporary Israel and advocate a societal shift away from the current militaristic
culture of the state. According to Yulia Zemlinskaya, their beliefs belong to a new
philosophy known as Post-Zionism, which, “…criticiz(es) the discriminatory nature of
the state defined in nationalistic terms…and provides a vision of a more civil and liberal
Israel.”67 One of the most visible manifestations of the Post-Zionist critique is the public
challenge to unconditional and uncontested service in the IDF.
As mentioned previously, these protest groups contest compulsory IDF service in
different ways. For instance, members of Yesh Gvul (“There is a limit!”) and Courage to
Refuse advocate the right of an IDF soldier to refuse to participate in military service on a
case-by-case basis. Comprised primarily of reservist soldiers, members of Yesh Gvul and
Courage to Refuse are not wholly opposed to military service. On the contrary, they
believe that IDF service is an important civic duty for Jewish Israelis. However, their
enthusiasm for military sacrifice is equaled by their intense objection to IDF operations in
Palestinian towns and neighborhoods. When ordered to serve in the Occupied Territories,
the soldiers belonging to these two groups argue that they possess the right for “selective
refusal.”68 According to their logic, if a soldier opposes – intellectually, politically,
emotionally or spiritually – a specific military plan, that soldier should be allowed the
freedom to refuse to be a party to the operation. They advocate a system in which the
IDF, “…allow[s] each individual the leeway to decide where, when and under what
circumstances he will fulfill his military duties.”69 To be sure, this line of reasoning
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neither rejects military service outright nor downplays the necessity of Israel’s powerful
military establishment. If anything, their selective refusal reflects a concern that IDF
operations in the Occupied Territories actually threaten the security of Israel proper by
inflaming anti-Israeli sentiments. So while the members of Yesh Gvul and Courage to
Refuse object to certain IDF strategies, they still remain deeply committed to the defense
of the Jewish nation.
Unlike Yesh Gvul and Courage to Refuse, members of New Profile and
Shministim (“twelfth graders”) reject IDF service outright. Composed of high-school age
Jewish Israelis, these conscientious objectors oppose all forms of military service, from
roles in combat and logistical support to educational and media functions. This younger
generation of conscientious objectors is ardently pacifistic, wholly committed to
preserving life at all costs. For these youths, human life is priceless, and its existence
should not be threatened by any mandatory state requirements. Hence,
…the value of the nation-state is nullified by the value of human life…The
state [is] a tool that is meant to serve its citizens. No state can demand its
citizens to sacrifice their life in its name. The existence of people…‘is
more important than existence of a country.’ The Jewish state is not an
exception.70
Members of New Profile and Shministim refuse to place their lives in danger for the sake
of the State of Israel, arguing that the government does not have the moral authority to
make such demands. In addition to this conviction, these students castigate the very
nature of Israel’s conscription policy, asserting that military service is a source of moral
decay. With strikingly similar rhetoric as young haredi males who do not serve in the
IDF, these largely secular youngsters view military service, “…as corrupting society’s
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moral image, as harming its security and economy,” and they believe that,
“…participating in the military means committing immoral acts.”71 In sum, for the
members of New Profile and Shministim, military service is utterly negative, no matter
the utility it provides in protecting the existence of the Jewish state.
The actions of all four groups described above have not been without controversy.
Like the policy of haredi yeshiva student exemptions, the Israeli courts have weighed in
on the matter of draft resistance and conscientious objection. In one well-known case,
The Military Prosecutor v Private Haggai Matar et al. (2003), five individuals who
refused to report for duty in the Occupied Territories were put on trial, charged with
disobeying a direct military order. After hearing both sides of the argument, the court
ruled against the defendants, summarizing its opinion in a particularly sharp verdict:
This is [an] ideological or political crime, and it is more severe and
dangerous than regular criminal activity stemming from a wish for
personal benefit…not only do they disobey the law, they renounce its
compulsory power. They might be imitated by others, enjoy the support of
people and public institutions, which hinders an egalitarian enforcement of
law, and might gather around them a large public, who might be prepared
to exhibit violence [sic] behavior to the point of mutiny and rebellion
against the authorized government, that is, democratic society.72
From this statement, it is clear how the government feels about conscientious objectors
and draft-dodgers: they simply cannot be tolerated. Jewish Israeli youth must willfully
report for military service and unquestioningly obey orders. Any resistance to this policy,
as the court surmised in its opinion, threatens the very stability the Jewish nation.
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But why are the haredim seemingly shielded from punishment for not reporting
for military duty unlike the rest of their young peers? Are the tens of thousands of haredi
youths exempted from military service not an example that might be imitated? Do haredi
military exemptions represent an egalitarian enforcement of the law? These are difficult
questions to answer, and any conclusions are certain to be controversial. Nevertheless, it
is imperative to take note of the court’s aforementioned verdict when considering the
societal strife engendered by the government’s long-standing policy of wholesale military
exemptions for haredi yeshiva students. Indeed, the government’s apparent doubledealing is not without consequences.

Public Opinion and Conscription Policy
The data reveal that the majority of Israelis supports current IDF conscription
procedures and opposes the right of a soldier to refuse orders to serve. According to
Asher Arian, 89 percent of the Jewish population favored conscription service over a
volunteer army in 2001.73 Moreover, Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked report that in
the years 2003-2007, an average of over 75 percent of Jewish Israelis considered the
refusal of an IDF soldier to serve in the Occupied Territories as illegitimate, with their
disapproval for refusing orders peaking at 83 percent in 2004 and dropping to 68 percent
in 2005.74 Arian also reports that in 2003, a meager 27 percent of Jewish Israelis believed
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that the responsibility of military service was spread out equally among the population,
owing to a large extent to their disapproval of military exemptions bequeathed to certain
social groups.75
A more detailed explanation of this disapproval is revealed in the data offered by
Eliezer Ben-Rafael in his 2008 essay, “The Faces of Religiosity in Israel: Cleavages or
Continuum.” He presents the findings of a survey question given to 971 Jewish Israeli
respondents, in which they are invited to measure their attitude to the question, “Military
service is crucial in Israel; should some groups be exempted – such as ultra-Orthodox
youngsters, religious women, Arabs, or pacifists?”76 The respondents are asked to
describe their attitude toward military exemptions as “opposed,” “don’t really know,” or
“yes,” and their responses are broken down according to their self-identified religious
orientation (see Table 1). Ben-Rafael’s findings are consistent with Arian’s findings, as in
2008, 71 percent of all respondents opposed military exemptions. If the ultra-Orthodox
respondents are excluded from the sample, the average rises to 74 percent. Of those
favoring military exemptions, the national average is 14 percent, and it drops to 12
percent when the ultra-Orthodox are excluded. The non-religious and traditional
categories reflect these averages, as 77 percent of the non-religious and 74 percent of the
traditional oppose military exemptions, and 9 percent of the non-religious and 13 percent
of the traditional respondents support military exemptions. Most likely, the respondents
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Table 1: Attitudes toward Exemptions from the Military (n=971).
Military service is crucial in Israel; should some groups be exempted such as ultra-Orthodox youngsters, religious women, Arabs, or pacifists? (%)

Ultra-Orthodox (n=48)
Religious (n=95)
Traditional (n=334)
Non-religious (n=494)

Opposed
27
56
74
77

Don’t Really Know
23
24
13
14

Yes
50
20
13
9

Source: Eliezer Ben-Rafael, "The Faces of Religiosity in Israel:
Cleavages or Continuum?," Israel Studies 13, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 113.

from the previous two categories who favor military exemptions believe that either
conscientious objectors ought to be granted exemptions or Arab-Israeli citizens should
not be allowed to serve in the IDF.
The opinions of the religious and ultra-Orthodox respondents are more puzzling,
and the significant number of respondents that chose the vague “don’t really know”
option leaves much to speculation. For the religious respondents, of whom many are
members of the National Religious Party, only 56 percent oppose the policy of military
exemptions. This figure is indeed perplexing, because it is the national-religious segment
of Israel’s Jewish population that is most committed to retaining every square inch of
Eretz Yisrael. It seems reasonable to conjecture that people in the national-religious camp
would want every able-bodied Jewish Israeli fighting on the front lines. This figure may
indicate, however, that a large portion of the national-religious camp is content to carry
the bulk of the burden of military service.
Like the religious respondents, the opinions of the ultra-Orthodox toward military
exemptions are peculiar. The relatively high number of respondents who oppose military
exemptions (27 percent) and the surprisingly low number who support exemptions (50
38

percent) do not seem consistent with the theory that the haredi communities demonstrate
a wholesale approval of military exemptions for their young men. For this theory to be
accurate, one would expect to see a far lower percentage opposing military exemptions (a
negligible number consisting primarily of outliers) and a far higher percentage supporting
military exemptions (representative of far more than just half of the respondents). One
explanation is that this survey is not representative of the entire ultra-Orthodox
population, as only 5 percent of the respondents are ultra-Orthodox. A more accurate
study would need to incorporate 2-4 percent more ultra-Orthodox respondents. In spite of
this limitation, the numbers are still unexpected. Just as the percentage of ultra-Orthodox
men that serve in the IDF is far below the 27 percent of respondents who oppose military
exemptions, so is the percentage of haredi men who do not serve far above the 50 percent
who support exemptions.77 Even if the groups mentioned in the question are isolated from
one another – ultra-Orthodox youngsters, religious women, Arabs and pacifists – a
suitable explanation for these ultra-Orthodox opinions is still elusive. The current
numbers of exemptions for ultra-Orthodox youngsters proves that this exemption is
highly popular in haredi circles. Furthermore, the highly conservative and patriarchal
nature of the haredi communities makes it unlikely that haredi men would support
military service for their women, and advocating military service for Arabs is even less
likely, primarily due to the ethnocentric and xenophobic culture that pervades haredi
society. That leaves the pacifists. If the pacifists mentioned in this survey are separated
from any haredim who may have a pacifistic outlook and defined solely by their nonharedi religious beliefs, an explanation may be forthcoming. Since the haredim believe
77
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that the true ‘holders’ of the Torah should be exempted from military service, they may
also believe that all other Jewish Israelis who do not fully dedicate their lives to this
virtuous endeavor should, in fact, serve in the IDF. In this scenario, the haredim would
have to believe that exemptions are a privilege reserved only for the righteous; for those
who do not seek to impart God’s protection to the Jewish people spiritually, their fate lies
on the battlefield. Even this conclusion, however, is tenuous. The ultra-Orthodox
responses to this survey question are truly confounding.
With the rise of groups such as Yesh Gvul, Courage to Refuse, New Profile and
Shministim, a new twist has been added to the already controversial IDF conscription
policy. Members of these groups advocate the right of an individual Jewish Israeli to
decide if and when he/she wants to serve in the military. Yet unlike their fellow citizens
in the haredi communities, the members of these protest groups do not rely on a formal
governmental mechanism to legitimize their decision not to serve. Instead, they are often
subjected to criminal charges of disobedience and chastised as deleterious citizens of the
Israeli body politic. Herein lies a problem: the government acquiesces to the exemption
of haredi youngsters, justifying its actions by claiming that it must respect haredi
religious convictions. But when secular Israeli youth assert that their political orientation
conflicts with military service, they are punished. Despite this apparent government
hypocrisy, the Jewish Israeli public favors a true ‘universal’ conscription policy. A look
at the data above clearly shows that the majority of Jewish Israelis are opposed to both
conscientious objection and haredi military exemptions. For the bulk of the Jewish Israeli
public, who belong neither to the secular, pacifistic crowd on the left nor to the
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conservative, haredi communities on the right, military service should be borne equitably
by all Jewish Israelis.

Conclusion
This chapter discussed the significance of military service in Israeli society and
explained the benefits that the Israeli citizen derives from it. It also described how haredi
non-service has resulted in the marginalization of the haredi communities both socially
and economically. Moreover, it provided a brief summary of the negative responses of
conscripted Jewish Israelis to the policy of haredi exemptions. It then explored a situation
strikingly similar to haredi yeshiva student exemptions – the conscientious objector
movement – and followed with an in-depth analysis of Jewish Israeli public opinion on a
range of topics related to Israel’s conscription policy. In closing, the potential for an
eruption of conflict as a result of this policy is possible. While there is not yet any
evidence that this policy has produced a conflagration of violence between those who
serve and those who do not, there is little reason to believe that Israeli society is immune
from an aggressive and potentially violent solution to this conflict.
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Chapter Three
–

The Haredim Do Not Want to Serve
The first hypothesis of this thesis asks if the majority of haredi yeshiva students
do not serve in the IDF for the simple reason that they do not want to. In this scenario, it
is not a religious objection or a moral imperative against violence and conflict that shapes
their attitude to military service. On the contrary, haredi yeshiva students reject military
service for reasons that are historical, social and communal. Thus, this chapter will begin
by attempting to describe how the haredi communities perceive themselves in relation to
the State of Israel. By analyzing their self-identification as Jews still in exile as well as
their categorical rejection of Zionism, this chapter will show that the various sects of
haredim operate as a distinct community not beholden to the predominant values and
obligations that define the rest of Jewish Israeli society. It will then shed some light on
the world of the yeshiva by describing the importance placed on the role of the Torah
scholar and illustrating some of the fears that exist regarding the negative influence of
contact with the IDF. This chapter will conclude by attempting to determine the extent to
which these historical, social and communal factors induce young haredi males to
eschew military service.
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The Haredi Belief System
The foundation of the haredi belief system begins with the destruction of the
Second Jewish Temple in 70 C.E. Years after its destruction, the Jewish people were sent
into exile, forcing them to set up communities across the globe. For centuries, the Jewish
Diaspora resided in multiple nations and awaited their return to Eretz Yisrael (Hebrew for
Land of Israel). Traditional Jewish history represents this period of exile as the great
tragedy of the Jewish people. For the haredim, however, this exile of almost two
millennia is presented as a direct message from God. It was a,
…divine punishment of the people of Israel, a sign from heaven that
nonobservant Jews [did] not deserve a state of their own. Only through
full Jewish repentance and strict observance of God’s commandments
[would] God forgive and redeem His people.78
This redemption would be realized by the coming of the Messiah, who would reveal
Himself and usher His people back into Eretz Yisrael.
Late into the nineteenth century, the Jewish Diaspora remained in exile,
assimilated into various nations around the world. At this point, small communities of
religious Jews were living in Palestine. For most of the world’s Jewry, however, Palestine
was merely a destination for one’s death and burial. It was not until a little known Eastern
European Jewish journalist named Theodor Herzl popularized the concept of political
Zionism that world Jewry began to dream of finally returning to Eretz Yisrael. While
Zionism quickly gained a massive following, haredi communities spurned it, considering
it apostasy, as the Messiah had not yet revealed Himself. For the haredim, God,

78

Ehud Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the
Rabin Assassination (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 88.

43

…made it clear to His people that they were supposed to wait patiently
until He decided they were deserving of redemption. He instructed them
not to ‘rebel’ against the world’s nations and not to initiate massive Jewish
settlement in Eretz Israel [sic].79
As the Zionist ideology eventually gave way to the establishment of the State of Israel,
the haredim did not alter their stance; the State of Israel was illegitimate and the twothousand year exile of the Jewish people continued, uninterrupted.80
Indeed, large numbers of haredim immigrated to Israel at its independence, but
this was primarily due to the fact that many were escaping the horrors of the Holocaust
and had few options for sanctuary outside of Israel. What they found in Israel was a
society that had rejected the traditional and religious tenets of Judaism in favor of liberal
and secular values. Reacting to this discovery, the various haredim communities began to
view themselves as the true keepers of Judaism, since the rest of Israeli society had, in
their eyes, abandoned God and His blessings. As ‘real Jews,’ the haredi communities
increasingly started to, “…perceive life in Israel as exile among Jews,” connected to each
other by, “…a sense of collective trauma resulting from the choice of the majority of
Jewish society to leave the folds of traditional life in favor of other…options.”81 Owing
to their religious worldview, most haredim in Israel do not recognize the State of Israel or
its government. Their only concern is to ensure that historical Jewish traditions are not
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rendered obsolete – as nearly happened during the Holocaust – by modern Israeli
society.82
Because haredi communities reject the State of Israel, they believe that they are
de facto free of all civic duties, including military service. They claim that their
communities existed in Eretz Yisrael long before Zionism emerged, so they are free to
operate by their own standards and ignore the obligations incumbent on other Israeli
citizens.
By summoning the history of the ultra-Orthodox rejection of
Zionism…one essential element is missing from the social contract
reasoning according to which Israelis all owe equal duties to state: the
element of consent. The Haredim [sic]…not only withheld express consent
to the Zionist project but offered unequivocal rejection of [it].83
From the haredi point-of view, they might be Israeli citizens, but they are in no way
compelled to participate in the state’s institutions. Because they opposed the State of
Israel from the very beginning, the haredim do not feel as if they are indebted to the state.
Military service is for those Jewish Israelis who associate with the state; the haredi
communities disassociate themselves from the state and are therefore not responsible for
its defense.

Military Service and the Torah Scholar
One reason that the haredim avoid military service is because the IDF is
ideologically rooted in Zionism. Throughout its history, the IDF has ingrained in every
soldier an existential connection to the state. This is unacceptable for haredim, as Jews
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should have only one spiritual and temporal connection, their link to God. Yohai Hakak
observes that the haredim believe that the IDF,
…aims to exchange the attachment to G-d [sic] and religion with an
attachment to a nation, rendering G-d [sic] and spiritual aspects
redundant…other earthly issues – such as the quality, sophistication and
readiness of the weaponry of the soldiers – are more relevant. Man and not
G-d [sic] plays the central role.84
Anything that comes between the yeshiva student and God is considered a sin, and the
student’s devotion to God is uncompromising. Affinity for any worldly pleasure or object
is strictly forbidden. Consequently, IDF service, in which the development of a love for
Israel is a key component, is utterly dangerous and threatens to undermine the yeshiva
student’s steadfast commitment to God.
A poster observed by author Nurit Stadler in the ultra-Orthodox Jerusalem
neighborhood of Meah Shearim demonstrates this attitude to military service. It reads,
“Suicidal! Be all that you can be in the Nahal.”85 Ironically, the poster’s mention of
suicide does not allude to physical death. More accurately, it refers to spiritual death, the
result of abandoning yeshiva studies to serve in the military. Although the young haredi
male can return to the yeshiva after he serves, his decision to interrupt his Torah study is
a transgression of the highest order. Study of religious texts is a lifelong undertaking.
Deviation for any purpose, at any time during the student’s life, is problematic for the
scholar. Military service, in particular, corrupts the yeshiva student by removing him
from his community and placing him in “…a highly dangerous and contaminated sphere
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of action.”86 This experience can prove to be disastrous for the Torah scholar, as it
directly affects his ability to interpret God’s word. Hence,
…he is not suitable or fit for service in the army because of the physical
and mental practices required of him as a studious man. A yeshivah [sic]
student is supposed to a possess a gentle and wise soul, and only this
sensitivity allows him to study with utter devotion.87
If a yeshiva student chooses to enlist, his ability to scrutinize the scriptures will be
forever altered. He cannot expect to return to his studies after military service with the
same vigor that he once possessed. His value as a Torah scholar, then, is drastically
reduced.
The fear that one’s ability to study the Torah will be affected by military service
did not evolve in a vacuum. To be sure, haredi leaders have worked tirelessly to instill
this line of thinking into the young and impressionable men in their communities. Stadler,
Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari argue that, “attitudes to military service highlight the
persistent attempt to preserve religious separateness from secular state activities in order
to maintain the exclusive cultural values and life-styles of the ultra-Orthodox.”88 Their
reasons are two-fold, one official and one unspoken. Haredi leaders’ official justification
for dissuading young men from enlisting in the IDF is to protect them from the
secularizing effects of military service. One danger that they point to is the mingling of
sexes in the IDF. Haredi men are instructed to avoid succumbing to physical and mental
temptations with women. As such, young haredi men are usually kept away from
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interacting with women until they marry. In the IDF, where men and women serve in the
same units, complete gender segregation is difficult to guarantee. Although the Nahal
battalion is segregated from female soldiers, the chances that haredi men will encounter
women in the army are still high. The temptation to interact with females in the army is
far too risky for haredi leaders to allow their young men to enlist.89
In addition to the danger of mixing with the female gender, haredi leaders believe
that the IDF will, “…expose Haredi [sic] to a corrupted youth culture,” which will lead to
the questioning of their traditions.90 As has already been discussed, the IDF brings
together myriad cultures and values. Since most IDF recruits are still in their late teens,
they are very impressionable and susceptible to new ideas and beliefs. Yeshiva students
are no exception.
Mixing with all types of Israelis, including secular Jews, traditional Jews
and those who call themselves ‘religious’ Zionists, the young Haredi [sic]
will hear perspectives on the world and Judaism he has never heard before
and meet temptations he hasn’t dreamt of.91
New ideas can have a devastating effect on the young haredi man, as they might lead the
yeshiva student to doubt the existence of God or question His commandments. This
would undoubtedly constitute an unforgivable sin. In order to protect yeshiva students
from committing this sin, the haredi authorities believe that yeshiva students ought to
avoid this venue of temptation altogether.
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Political Consequences of Haredi Enlistment
What was previously discussed is the officially espoused haredi viewpoint. Yet,
one other factor of IDF service quietly concerns haredi authorities. This concern involves
numbers and power. Haredi leaders depend on strong and united haredi communities.
Bigger communities lead to larger voting blocs, which in turn lead to stronger legislative
powers in the Knesset. Haredi politicians need high levels of electoral support in order to
more forcefully promote legislation that both provides increasing welfare benefits to
haredi communities and pushes for more stringent religious regulations on public life in
Israel. As such, haredi leaders cannot afford to lose members of their communities to
other ways of life. It is precisely for this reason that haredi leaders discourage young
haredim from enlisting in the military. They are afraid that the yeshiva student will be
attracted to other worldviews offered to him in the army and leave the folds of the ultraOrthodox community.92 Should too many young haredi men choose this path, the
thinking goes, the very survival of the haredi communities in Israel would be
jeopardized.93

Social Repercussions of Military Service
For yeshiva students themselves, fear of enlistment goes beyond the concern that
it will affect their studies or damage their standing in the eyes of God. Indeed, enlistment
can engender severe social consequences for the yeshiva student. Because the IDF is
associated with Zionism, young haredi men cannot join without creating the impression
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that they sympathize with the ideology of mainstream Israeli society. There is the fear
among yeshiva students that any association with the Zionist enterprise automatically
leads to difficulty in rising through the ranks of haredi society. Military service can affect
one’s ability to find employment in the community, and worse, hinder one’s ability to
marry and have children. Stadler and Ben-Ari quote a yeshiva student who voices this
anxiety:
You have to understand that from a young age they get it into our heads
that the army in an abomination, obscenity, that boys and girls are together
all of the time…The eighteen-year-old members of the [haredim] are
concerned to find a good match for marriage. Your stock goes up in direct
proportion to the study of the Torah and any involvement in the army on
the part of your family turns you immediately into a second class citizen.94
From this comment, it appears that haredi leaders have provoked a fear of military
service by attaching a deleterious stigma to it. Having done so, haredi leaders utilize this
fear as a mechanism for social control. Their power over the thought processes of the
young haredi male population allows haredi authorities to preserve the ‘sanctity’ of their
communities and present a united front against the secular currents of mainstream Israeli
society. Deviation from community norms is anathema, and haredi leaders make sure that
their members are well aware of the consequences of independent thought and action.

Conclusion
From the information offered in this chapter, one can conclude that haredi
yeshiva students evade military service for the simple reason that they do not want to
serve. Because their historical traditions conflict with the very foundations of
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contemporary Israeli society, the haredim have placed themselves outside of the
parameters of citizenship. They reject the State of Israel and thus refuse to acquiesce to
the obligations incumbent of normal Israeli citizens. In addition, haredi yeshiva students
believe that their studies will suffer if they choose to interrupt them by enlisting in the
military. Since Torah study takes precedence over everything, the yeshiva student cannot
expect to unravel the mysteries of God’s word if he devotes any portion of his time to
other considerations. Moreover, the haredi yeshiva student must remain pure. IDF service
will expose the haredi youth to a world of transgression, and such an encounter can lead
to a life-style that is devoid of God’s divine blessings. Finally, haredi communities
condemn the man that enlists in the IDF. Owing to a need to preserve communal
homogeneity, haredi leaders indoctrinate their young men by warning them of the social
repercussions of military service. As such, the haredi man who serves in the IDF can
expect to return to his community as a corrupted member, and he will find it difficult, if
not impossible, to be perceived as a member fully committed to the haredi way of life. In
sum, while it can be concluded that haredi yeshiva students do not want to serve in the
IDF, it might be more appropriate to conclude that they cannot serve. The social
ramifications of military service are simply too difficult to endure.
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Chapter Four
–

The Haredim Are Pacifists
The second hypothesis of this thesis posits that haredi yeshiva students do not
serve in the IDF because they are pacifists. They refuse to participate in an institution that
actively engages in war and violent conflict, and their rejection of military service is a
political act of pacifism. On the surface, this hypothesis seems straightforward. A cursory
glance of the haredi communities’ political positions toward Israel’s involvement in
violent conflicts should prove or disprove this hypothesis. This is not the case. Indeed,
Israel’s haredim demonstrate a complex attitude to violence. Rhetorically, haredi
traditions teach pacifism and restraint. There exists a consensual understanding that
places a negative stigma on actions that result in the physical harm of a human being. In
their actions, however, the haredim exhibit a strong propensity to violence, evidenced by
a litany of aggressive incidents throughout their history in Israel. In an attempt to explain
this apparent inconsistency between word and deed, this chapter will begin by examining
the traditional haredi taboos associated with war and violence. It will then scrutinize
haredi political views in the context of Israel’s experience with war and peace.
Furthermore, this chapter will supply the reader with several examples of haredi
violence, aimed at both internal and external targets, and will conclude by analyzing how
future generations of haredim may regard the use of violence. After all of this has been
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presented, it will become clear that Israel’s haredim possess a nuanced and incongruous
notion of war and violent conflict.

Foundations of Haredi Pacifism
As discussed in chapter three, Israel’s haredi communities evince a passionate
rejection of Zionism, the founding ideology of the State of Israel. They believe that the
founders of the state committed a grave sin by initiating a nation-building project
independent of both God’s blessings and the revelation of the Messiah. Because of this
idolatrous hubris, the majority of the haredim did not participate in any fighting during
Israel’s War of Independence. In 1947, Amram Blau, leader of the haredi Neturei Karta
sect, told his brethren that the true Jewish believer avoids violence and conflict.
Therefore, he claimed, they must stay away from the fighting. He summoned the history
of the Jewish people to cement his point:
And after the destruction of the Temple and the exile of the People of
Israel from its land, and after the Lord, Blessed be He, charged Israel not
to rebel against the nations, there was no longer any possibility that Israel
would have to resort to the sword, to cruelty and to bloodshed, God forbid.
And it is two thousand years since Israel has returned its sword to the
scabbard and has passed all the years of its exile in a different manner, one
of submission and peace. Pliantly, it has faced all troubles and difficulties,
and has greatly distanced itself from any sense of cruelty, not to mention
murder and bloodshed. It has displayed a good and gentle spirit in its
relations with the nations in whose lands it lives in exile. This pureness
and innocence has been the glory of Israel in the eyes of the nations. And
now there are some, who take the name of Israel, that have begun to resort
to bloody hands, to turn the name of Israel known for its measure of
compassion into one associated with murder and bloodshed, God forbid, to
garb the People of Israel in clothing stained with blood. Even from the
blood of their brethren they do not abstain, God forbid (Ha’Homa [The
Wall], Neturei Karta journal, Kislev, December 1947).95
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In addition to Blau’s message to the Jewish people in Palestine, Agudat Israel, the haredi
political party in Mandate Palestine, condemned the violent tactics of the Jewish
insurgent groups such as the Irgun and Lehi. It declared, “terrorism is an alien branch in
the vineyard of loyal Judaism, a rotten fruit of secular political parties which educate for
the admiration of power of the fist and the hands of Esau.”96 From these statements, it is
clear war and violence were anathema to the haredim of the Mandate Period. As God’s
chosen people, they argued, Jews are morally and ethically above the resort to violence.
For the haredi yeshiva students of today’s Israel, this is certainly a legitimate justification
for avoiding military service. They might assert that the true Jew is a pacifist, an anointed
man who opposes war and violence in all forms, at all times. Gentiles wage war, they
might say, not Jews.

Haredi Political Views
Given this information, it comes as somewhat of a surprise that many non-haredi
Israelis believe that the haredim possess intense right-wing, hawkish political views.
Nurit Stadler claims these political attitudes are manifested by, “…Haredi [sic] support
for intensive military activity in the occupied territories, and…[the] general Haredi [sic]
approval of the army’s actions during the recent Intifadas.”97 Regarding the issue of
military exemptions, Chaim I. Waxman adds that these political views cause much
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friction with the majority of Israelis over the policy of military exemptions for haredi
yeshiva students. According to Waxman, “…there [is] resentment…over their Rightwing [sic] politics because their votes may move the country to a war in which they
[yeshiva students] will not fight.”98 Is there truth to these allegations? Do the haredim
demonstrate a right-wing bias? The data certainly point to this conclusion.
Using data collected by the Peace Index project team of the Tami Steinmetz
Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University, Tamar Hermann and Ephraim
Yuchtman-Yarr analyzed eighty-three surveys conducted between June 1994 and January
2001, each survey including approximately five hundred randomly selected Jewish
Israelis aged eighteen and over. With the results of these surveys, the authors placed each
respondent into “Right,” “Floating,” and “Left” categories based on their aggregate
voting behavior. Of the respondents who identified themselves as haredi, the authors
classified the voting behavior of 79.3 percent as “Right,” 18.3 percent as “Floating”
(middle) and 2.4 percent as “Left.”99 Whereas this data suggest that the haredi
communities exhibit right-wing voting behavior, other data indicate that, along with the
majority of the Jewish Israeli population, the haredi demographic belongs to the
moderate/center category of the political spectrum. As part of their larger study, “The
People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005-2007,” Yehuda Ben Meir
and Dafna Shaked submitted a questionnaire in 2006 to 724 Jewish Israeli respondents.
The questionnaire consisted of fifteen questions relating to Israel’s national security, and
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the aggregate results of each questionnaire were plotted along an axis that included the
categories, “extreme left,” “moderate left,” “center,” “moderate right,” and “extreme
right.” Based on their responses, 2 percent (1 respondent) of the 63 self-identified haredi
respondents landed in the extreme left category; 6 percent (4 respondents) landed in the
moderate left category; 56 percent (35 respondents) landed in the center category; 6
percent (4 respondents) landed in the moderate right category; and 30 percent (19
respondents) landed in the extreme right category.100 From these statistics, it is apparent
that while the haredim may vote for right-wing political parties, their political opinions
do not necessarily reflect a hard-line conservative outlook. At the same time, however,
exceptional events such as the al-Aqsa Intifada and the 2006 Lebanon War have a
centrifugal effect on haredi political opinions in much the same way that they do on the
Jewish Israeli population as a whole. What still needs to be determined is how similar are
the shifts in these opinions, and do the haredim tend to move further to the right during
times of conflict than do the rest of the Jewish Israeli population?
Before answering these questions, it is important to understand what factors
advise the political perspectives of Israel’s haredi communities. In particular, why does
the voting behavior of the haredim tend to favor right-wing political candidates? The
reasons are both cultural and historical. Culturally, Israel’s haredi communities are
isolated and exclusive. Membership in the haredi communities requires individuals to
withdraw from mainstream, secular Israeli society and embrace a bunker mentality, as
interaction with the non-haredi world threatens the religious purity of their lifestyle.
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Resulting from this practice is an acute sense of ethnocentricity. Jonathan Rynhold
provides an instructive perspective of this phenomenon:
…Religion generates a sense of an in-group and an out-group that serves
to encourage an ethnocentric orientation…This religious basis for group
differentiation gives ethnocentricity a reified quality that heightens its
resonance…This is especially relevant to the Jewish religious tradition,
which places God’s covenantal relationship with the Jewish people (rather
than with the individual) at its center.101
Certainly, Jewish Israelis define their Jewishness in multiple ways. For secular Jews in
Israel who observe little to no religious traditions, Jewishness is an ethnic concept, rooted
in an ancient and common history. As their identity is defined by being Israeli as much as
it is as being Jewish, most secular Jewish Israelis show few palpable signs of
ethnocentricity. On the other end of the spectrum, Israel’s haredi communities observe
all Jewish religious traditions, and they rarely, if ever, define themselves as Israeli.
Because they believe that only through complete adherence to Jewish religious
commandments and absolute faith in God can the Messiah reveal Himself, the haredim
reject all alternative lifestyles and codes of morality. Consequently, the haredim exhibit a
strong ethnocentric antipathy not only toward non-haredi Jewish Israelis but also toward
non-Jewish Israelis and Israel’s Arab neighbors. The political upshot of this
ethnocentricity is revealed through hawkish political attitudes, and thus, political
movements based on the liberal tenets of freedom, justice and equality do not infiltrate
the haredi communities.102 Accordingly, when a political candidate espouses
conservative views, he/she will more likely than not secure the vote of the haredim.
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Haredi partiality towards right-wing politicians is also rooted in a series of
historical events beginning with the 1967 War. After the IDF subdued its enemies in the
lightning-quick Six-Day War, Israel found itself in possession of East Jerusalem and the
biblical territories of Judea and Samaria. For nearly two decades before the war, these
plots of land had merely been the object of intense dreams and desires. Now, in 1967,
Jewish Israelis could travel freely to these destinations and landmarks that played such a
significant role in ancient Jewish history. Following this development, popular political
rhetoric in Israel began incorporating religious – even messianic – symbols, as the
surprise victory and reclamation of ancient Jewish lands were framed in terms that
credited God with this unimaginable triumph. Although the haredim did not – and still do
not – assign significance to the landmass that is Israel and the disputed territories, they
nevertheless warmed to the segments of mainstream Israeli society that shifted away from
rigidly secular political oratory toward a religio-political platform. Unsurprisingly, these
segments belonged primarily to the political Right.103
Haredi participation in politics may have waned in subsequent years as the
moderate-left Labor Party maintained uninterrupted control of Israel for the next decade.
However, with the paradigm-shifting victory of the right-wing Likud Party in 1977, the
haredim found political leadership more in tune with the interests of their ultra-Orthodox
lifestyle. Menachem Begin, the leader of the Likud Party, both emphasized the
uniqueness of the Jewish people and identified with the elements of the public who
observed Jewish religious tradition. As such, the haredim began to feel as if they had
102

Rynhold, “Religion, Postmodernization,” 381 and Ben Meir, “The People Speak,” 33.

103

Rynhold, “Religion, Postmodernization,” 383.

58

more in common with the new right-wing government in Israel than with previous leftleaning incarnations.104
Since Begin’s government in the late 1970s / early 1980s, the haredim have
expanded their role in politics. Interestingly, their political support alters between rightand left-wing governments. Despite the perception that they perpetually gravitate toward
right-wing candidates, in reality, the haredim back candidates that promise to advance
their sectarian interests. For example, the haredim look for candidates who promise to
subsidize their way of life by providing massive chunks of welfare for unemployed
haredi men and their large families, funding for religious schools and synagogues, and
segregated government housing blocs. Moreover, haredi voters favor candidates who
pledge to place religious restrictions on Israeli public life. These voters seek,
…to implement Talmudic law by enacting national legislation such as
prohibiting work or public transportation on Shabbat, as well as the sale of
non-kosher food [because] their religious convictions command them to
involve themselves in all Jewish matters, including the lives of secular
Jews. 105
Aside from these interests, the haredi vote is normally based on little else. Unlike the
national-religious camp, the haredim are not concerned with retaining every square inch
of Eretz Yisrael, and they therefore do not recognize the utility of involving themselves in
matters relating to the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict – unless, of course, it is to prod
the Israeli government into protecting haredi settlements in the disputed territories, in

104

Rynhold, “Religion, Postmodernization,” 384.

105

Ben-Rafael, “The Faces of Religiosity,” 94.

59

which case, any politician, right or left, who promises to safeguard these communities
usually wins the support of the haredim.106
The previous paragraphs have detailed the bases of haredi political opinion and
voting behavior. Yet while this information is true, it is also presented in a vacuum; more
specifically, the aforementioned argument is best confirmed during times of relative
peace and stability. For, in times of violent conflict, haredi political opinion takes on
much different form, and more than any other demographic in Israel, violent conflict
pushes the haredim furthest to the Right. Data provided by Asher Arian’s “Israeli Public
Opinion on National Security 2003” illuminates this thesis. In his study, Arian tracks the
responses of Jewish Israelis to the same question from three separate years – 1994, 1999,
and 2003. The question asks if official treaties signify the end of conflict, and Arian
records the number of respondents who “strongly agree” and “agree.” He then separates
the respondents into four categories based on the extent of their religious observance:
“none” or secular, “some” or traditional, “most” or Orthodox, and “all” or ultraOrthodox. The significance of the years Arian chooses to compare lies in each year’s
association with peace and conflict. For instance, 1994 followed a year in which both the
First Intifada came to a close and the Oslo Accords were signed. In 1999, the general
mood was hopeful as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seemed to be nearing a resolution
after several successive treaties and agreements were signed over the past six years.
Finally, 2003 was two years after the al-Aqsa Intifada erupted, and few could envision an
end to the horrific daily displays of violence and bloodshed. Of the three years, 1994
appears to be the control year across the board, as the responses of all four categories in
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this year are almost the exact mean of the responses from 1999 and 2003. A look at Table
2 shows that all categories in 1999 responded more positively to the question than they
did in 1994, and all categories in 2003 responded more negatively than in 1994. The
ultra-Orthodox respondents dropped from an astonishing 40 percent agreement with the
question in 1999 to a dismal 13 percent in 2003, a total decline of 27 percent. Orthodox
responses fell 21percent over this period, from 51 percent agreement in 1999 to 30
percent agreement in 2003. The traditional and secular respondents expressed an even
greater change of opinion from 1999 to 2003, even though their disagreement with the
question was nowhere near the negative attitudes of the ultra-Orthodox respondents.

Table 2: Religious Breakdown of those Affirming that Treaties Signify
End of Conflict, 1994, 1999, and 2003.
(Percentage of those who strongly agree and agree)
Religious Observance ->

None

Some

Most

All

1994

59

50

34

26

1999

77

72

51

40

2003

44

38

30

13

Source: Asher Arian, "Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003," Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum no. 67 (October 2003): pp. 26.

Traditionalists and Secularists decreased 34 percent and 33 percent respectively, with the
former falling from 72 percent agreement in 1999 to 38 percent in 2003 and the latter
shrinking from 77 percent agreement in 1999 to 44 percent in 2003.107 From these
figures, it is clear that violent conflict pushes all Jewish Israelis to the Right. While
violent conflict creates a greater degree of opinion shift among Traditionalists and
Secularists than the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox, it nevertheless pushes the haredim
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furthest to the Right. These figures also reveal that even during times of relative peace,
the haredim are equally or more pessimistic about the prospects for peace than are the
Secularists and Traditionalists during times of intense conflict. It seems, then, that the
haredim are, at all times, more right-wing than the rest of the Jewish Israeli population.
Arian’s work in “Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2001” advances the
argument that the haredim adopt stronger right-wing views during times of violent
conflict than the rest of Jewish Israeli society. Drawn from surveys conducted between
April 12, 2001 and May 11, 2001, Arian reports the opinions of 1,216 Jewish Israeli
respondents during the seventh month of the bloody and traumatic al-Aqsa Intifada. One
of his surveys asks respondents to gauge their support or opposition to the peace projects
of then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak (i.e. 1999 peaces talks with Syria, 2000 Camp David
Accords with Palestinians). The response choices are “strongly oppose,” “oppose,”
“support,” and “strongly support,” and like the previous table, the respondents are
identified by the extent of their religious observance. A full 90 percent (see Table 3) of
the respondents categorized as observing all religious tradition strongly opposed or
opposed Barak’s proposals. Compared to those who observe most religious tradition (79
percent), some religious tradition (54 percent), and no religious tradition (42 percent), the
ultra-Orthodox were by far the most anti-peace religious demographic. Furthermore, a
mere 10 percent of the ultra-Orthodox supported or strongly supported Barak’s peace
plans, compared with 21 percent of those who observe most, 36 percent of those who
observe some, and 58 percent who observe no religious tradition. Most intriguing from
these statistics is that 4 times more ultra-Orthodox respondents (52 percent) strongly
opposed these peace plans than did secular respondents who strongly supported them (13
62

percent).108 While this may be an indication that the general Jewish Israeli mood was not
optimistic about the possibility of peace at the time, it nevertheless shows that the
haredim were far more anti-peace than the secular were pro-peace. This is most certainly
a reflection of how severely the current violent conflict had affected every Jewish
Israeli’s political views.
Table 3: Support or Opposition to the Barak Proposals Broken Down by
Religious Observance (%)
Strongly
Oppose

Oppose

Support

Strongly
Support

Observe all

52

38

8

2

Observe most

34

45

20

1

Observe some

25

39

32

4

Observe none

15

27

45

13

Religious Observance

Source: Asher Arian, "Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2001," Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum no. 60 (August 2001): pp. 38.

An additional survey by Arian in 2001 paints a more disturbing picture. He
presents the statement, “There is no military solution to the conflict,” to the respondents
and asks them to place themselves in the categories of “disagree,” “middle,” and “agree.”
Again, he breaks down the respondents according to the extent of their religious
observance. Interestingly, all four religious groups hovered around 12-13 percent in the
ambivalent “middle” category (see Table 4). Of the respondents who observed all
religious tradition, more than a quarter agreed with the statement, as did 51 percent of the
respondents who observed no religious tradition. However, 59 percent of the ultra-
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Table 4: Military Solution to the Conflict Broken Down
by Religious Observance (%)
Question: "There is no military solution to the conflict."
Religious Observance

Disagree

Middle

Agree

Observe all

59

12

29

Observe most

54

13

33

Observe some

49

13

38

Observe none

37

12

51

Source: Asher Arian, "Israeli Public Opinion on National Security
2001," Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum no. 60
(August 2001): pp. 37.

Orthodox respondents disagreed with the statement, believing that there was a military
solution to the conflict. At the same time, more than one-third of the secular respondents
and almost half of the traditional respondents found a military solution to be a viable
option.109 When compared to Table 3, the opinions of the secular and traditional
respondents are stable. The 51 percent of the Secularists who did not believe there was a
military solution to the conflict are in line with the 58 percent of Secularists who
supported and strongly supported Barak’s peace proposals. Similarly, the 38 percent of
Traditionalists who agreed that the conflict could not be solved through military means
mirrors the 36 percent of Traditionalists who supported and strongly supported Barak’s
peace plans. This correlation, however, does not apply to the ultra-Orthodox respondents.
Whereas only 10 percent of the ultra-Orthodox supported or strongly supported Barak’s
peace policy, almost three times as many ultra-Orthodox respondents (29 percent) agreed
that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could not be solved with military action. To be sure,
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these figures demonstrate that the vast majority of ultra-Orthodox haredim do not
consider a peaceful resolution to the conflict to be feasible, placing them squarely in the
right-wing camp. But questions linger as to the logic of the haredi respondents who
agreed that the military could not bring the conflict to a close. If there was no military
solution to the conflict, and Barak’s strategy for settling the conflict peacefully was
unacceptable, how then did this 29 percent imagine that peace could be attained? Perhaps
they believed that God would divinely usher in an era of peace, or perhaps they did not
want peace at all.
A 2004/2005 study substantiates the findings from Table 4, indicating that the
haredim are more likely than the rest of Jewish Israeli society to condone a
disproportionate use of military force to counter acts of terrorism. Table 5 displays data
that was gathered by the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa.
Over a period of four years – October 2000 through April 2004 – Daphna Canetti-Nisim,
Eran Zaidise and Ami Pedahzur conducted eight identical telephone surveys with
approximately 1,640 Jewish Israelis, in which they asked the respondents to indicate their
support for various militant statements. For the purpose of this study, one particular
statement stands out: “All means are justified in Israel’s war against terror.”110 The data
show that in seven out of eight surveys, the haredim favored unleashing the IDF on
terrorists by an average margin that is almost 5 percent higher than the rest of Israel’s
Jews. Realistically, this disparity does not reveal much of a difference between the
haredim and the other Jewish respondents, as the vast majority of Jewish Israelis
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Table 5: Percentage of Support for Militant Statements: Israeli
Jews (total) and Haredim, October 2000 - April 2004
"All means are justified in Israel's war against terror."
Date:

Oct.
2000

Jews (total)
Haredim

79.3
79

Apr.
2001
77.2
81.5

Oct.
2001
81.2
86.4

Apr.
2002
80.2
87.4

Oct.
2002
78.1
81.4

Apr.
2003
76.6
78

Oct.
2003
74.4
79.9

Apr.
2004
77.1
84.8

Source: Daphna Canetti-Nisim, Eran Zaidise and Ami Pedahzur,
"Militant Attidutes among Israelis througout the al-Aqsa Intifada,"
Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture 11, no. 3/4
(2004/2005): 108.

displayed extremely high levels of acceptance for heavy-handed military tactics during
the al-Aqsa Intifada. Nevertheless, these data are consistent with the bulk of the data
already discussed in this chapter: the haredim are more right-wing than the rest of Jewish
Israeli society, even if they are so by a mere 5 percent.
One final table shows just how large a gap exists between the political opinions of
the haredim and Israel’s less- or non-religious Jewish populations. The following figures
come from the same 2006 survey conducted by Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked.
These researchers asked respondents to react to four central issues of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and then cataloged their responses into four main religious groups.
The results substantiate the claim in this thesis that the ultra-Orthodox are considerably
more right-wing in their political outlook than most of the Jewish Israeli population.
Asked if they believed that there was a possibility of reaching a peace agreement with the
Palestinians, 11 percent of the ultra-Orthodox concurred, compared with 21 percent
religious, around 33 percent of the traditionalists and 44 percent of the secular
respondents (see Table 6). As to whether the respondents would support a peace
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Table 6: Major Issues of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Broken Down by
Religious Affiliation (%)
Issue

UltraOrthodox

Religious

Traditional

Secular

11

21

~33

44

84

79

46

37

Support for Gaza
Disengagement

10

15

~50

67

Agreement to
Palestinian State

21

36

67

76

Possibility of Reaching
Peace Agreement with
Palestinians
Agreement Involving
neither Major Territorial
Concessions nor Disengagement with Minor Ones

Source: Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, "The People Speak: Israeli Public
Opinion on National Security 2005-2007," The Institute for National Security
Studies, Memorandum no. 90 (May 2007): pp. 40.

agreement that involved major territorial concessions or at least minor concessions as part
of a disengagement strategy, 84 percent of the ultra-Orthodox opposed this approach, as
did 79 percent religious, 46 percent traditional and 37 percent secular. Ten percent of the
ultra-Orthodox supported former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s Gaza disengagement
plan, with 15 percent of the religious respondents supporting, about half of the
traditionalists supporting, and 67 percent of the secular respondents favoring the policy.
Finally, when faced with the question of whether they would agree to the establishment
of a Palestinian state, 21 percent of the ultra-Orthodox respondents replied in the
affirmative, in contrast to 36 percent religious, 67 percent traditional, and 76 percent
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secular.111 Once more, the data suggest that Israel’s haredim are the most right-wing and
non-pacifistic religious demographic in present-day Israel.
After studying this data, it is necessary to return to the primary thesis question of
this research: why do the majority of young haredi males not serve in the IDF? There
appears to be a major inconsistency between the opinions and rhetoric of the haredim and
their actions. If 90 percent of the haredim oppose peace proposals and a further 59
percent believe that there is a military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, why
have the numbers of exempted haredim skyrocketed over the decades? Is there some
truth to the belief of many Jewish Israelis that the haredim are pushing Israel into a war
in which they will not fight?

Episodes of Haredi Violence
In present-day Israel, the haredi pacifistic tenets of old are not readily observable
in their interactions with other Jewish Israelis. Because of the predominance of Zionist
ideology in Israeli society, the haredim feel threatened by secular currents and believe
that they are, in effect, “…constantly at war to defend [their] way of life.”112 Soon after
Israeli independence, concrete signs of this war became manifest. The same man who
spoke out against the Jewish resort to violence and war, Amram Blau, emerged as the
leader of the Neturei Karta (“Guardians of the City”), a radical contingent of the haredi
sect Eda Haredit. This sect declared:
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God is our king and we are His servants. It is our obligation and calling to
preserve His teaching, and since we do not recognize the rule of the
infidels, because they are rebels against the kingdom of our Creator-King
be blessed, it is forbidden to obey and work for a rebellious regime. Our
Torah is our constitution and…under no condition can we respect their
[the Zionists’] laws.113
Blau firmly believed that he had an obligation to God to oppose the Israeli regime, and he
instructed his followers to take a proactive approach in resisting the secularizing tide of
Zionist ideology. Blau’s preferred method of resistance was protest. In the 1950s, he
organized a succession of mass demonstrations in Jerusalem protesting Sabbath
desecration. For five years, he and his followers harassed drivers who dared to pass
through the haredi neighborhood of Mea Shearim on the Sabbath. When the police
arrived to disperse the demonstrators, members of Neturei Karta escalated the fracas,
sometimes violently. In the ensuing struggles, the police responded with mass beatings
and arrests.114 Since then, thousands of radical haredim have turned out to protest
countless Israeli projects in Jerusalem, most notably of which occurred in the 1980s,
when they demonstrated against the excavation of ancient Hebrew Jerusalem in the City
of David and the building of a Brigham Young University facility on the Mount of
Olives.115
Over the years, haredi protests have become increasingly violent. No longer are
their rallies confined to simple demonstrations. To be sure, their tactics have intensified
to include riots, beatings, break-ins, rock throwing and firebombing.116 The most
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egregious examples of haredi aggression transpired in the mid- to late- 1980s, when a
young haredi yeshiva student named Yehuda Meshi-Zahav entered the scene. While Blau
placed limits on the extent to which he actively opposed Zionism, Meshi-Zahav had no
such conviction. As the ‘operations chief’ of the haredi activists, Meshiv-Zahav planned
intricate assaults on Zionist targets. In 1986, he coordinated several attacks on bus stops
in and around Jerusalem that featured profane advertisements depicting women in bikinis.
Over 700 of his acolytes, which included members of Eda Haredit, the Satmar Hasidics
and students of the Toldot Aharon yeshiva, raided 142 bus stops, completely destroying
48 of them by fire.117 On February 9, 1989, Meshi-Zahav was arrested following 15
attacks on Zionist targets between August 1988 and February 1989. During his
interrogation, police suspected that Meshi-Zahav had formed a new group, Keshet (“a
group that would not keep silent”), which was planning attacks of epic proportion. Their
suspicion was confirmed when police discovered that Keshet had placed several
explosives along the highway connecting Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv.118 Despite these
crimes, Meshi-Zahav was eventually released, only to reappear at the site of a skirmish
between border police and Palestinians during the al-Aqsa Intifada. Questioned by
reporters as to the reason for his appearance, Meshi-Zahav replied that he was,
“…observ[ing] new methods of fighting the Zionists.”119
Unlike Meshi-Zahav, who directed his assaults primarily at external targets, much
violence exists within the haredi communities. This violence focuses on haredi
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individuals who are perceived to be either actively engaged in sin and profanation or
overly conciliatory to Zionist representatives and institutions. Two examples are worth
mentioning. The first example involves a group of haredim who are known as the
mishmeret hazenu’it (sexual modesty guard). Not only does this group physically assault
prostitutes in haredi neighborhoods, but it also interferes in the romantic relationships of
unmarried haredi men and women who are seen together in public places. In many cases,
the guard’s encounters with couples involve violent threats and beatings.120 The second
example occurred in June 1984 when a large group of yeshiva students belonging to the
Gur Hasidic sect attacked Menachem Porush, an ultra-Orthodox member of the Knesset.
Porush, whom the students believed sympathized with Zionist members in the Knesset,
was 60-years-old at the time of the attack. After the students battered him relentlessly,
Porush was taken to the intensive care unit of a hospital where he remained for two
weeks.121
Although Porush’s beating and Meshi-Zahav’s tactics are horrific, instances such
as these are unique in the haredi world. By and large, haredi aggression is limited to
protests and inflammatory rhetoric. This is principally because the haredim do, in fact,
place an inherent value on Jewish life. Ehud Sprinzak contends that the haredim operate
under a concept of ‘limited violence,’ “…based on the belief that Jewish life, including
the life of the secular, is sacred and the killing of Jews is absolutely forbidden.”122 Due to
a general compliance with this concept, no deaths have been ascribed to haredi violence,
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and the cases of haredi violence resulting in life-threatening physical injuries are rare.
Friedman adequately describes this phenomenon:
Haredi [sic] society is clearly unusual in that the potential for violence
within it does not culminate in bloodshed but rather is defined,
circumscribed and controlled…by means of education that penetrates
deeply into haredi [sic] consciousness. 123
Just as Amram Blau once instructed, the true Jewish believer does not pick up the sword.

The Future of Haredi Violence
Notwithstanding the conventional taboo against violence, there are reasons to
believe that there will be an escalation of haredi violence in the future. First, Israel has
been building new haredi neighborhoods in the territories outside the limits of the ‘Green
Line.’ Because these housing units are far cheaper than those in and around Jerusalem
and more suited to the average haredi income, many haredi families have chosen to
move into these neighborhoods and create new haredi communities. As residents of these
controversial territories, the haredim may witness the extremist behavior of Israel’s
settler communities and begin to emulate the settlers’ violent activities. Although the
haredim do not share the same patriotic feelings as the national-religious settlers, they
may nevertheless feel a certain obligation to protect the settlements through the use of
violent force.124 Second, military exemptions for yeshiva students extend to ‘born-again’
Jews. In many cases, these newly religious individuals are criminals and delinquents who
have not been inculcated with the demand for a strict adherence to haredi traditions.
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Thus, these individuals have not been imbued with the traditional haredi concepts of
restraint and limited violence. For the newly religious individuals who are especially
zealous, their newfound religion may compel them to act out in a violent fashion against
Zionist targets, if only so they may demonstrate proof of their total devotion to God.125
Finally, the haredim are, for all intents and purposes, a fundamentalist group. As such,
they share many of the same traits and tendencies with other religio-ideological
fundamentalist groups, most notably Christian and Islamic. Unfortunately over the past
three decades, the world has borne witness to the type of carnage that a religiously
motivated fundamentalist group can wreak. To be sure, the haredim in Israel have never
perpetrated acts of extreme terror or mass murder. However, the high frequency of
religiously inspired attacks around the world leads many to speculate over the extent to
which these acts of violence influence the haredim. Ultimately, Israel’s haredim may
attempt to replicate these catastrophic acts of violence at some point in the future.126

Conclusion
This chapter began by asking if haredi yeshiva students do not serve in the IDF
because they are pacifists who reject all forms of violence. Through an examination of
this hypothesis, evidence arose that both corroborated and contradicted this statement.
The haredim began to exhibit anti-militaristic tendencies as early as Israel’s War for
Independence, as most haredim believed that the Jewish people were ethically superior to
those who practiced war, so they refused to take up arms and fight during this critical

125

Friedman, “Haredi Violence,” 195-196.

126

Ibid., 195.

73

period in Israel’s history. In addition, the haredim are the most right-wing religious
demographic in present-day Israel. Not only do the haredim overwhelmingly reject peace
overtures en masse, but they also endorse severe military actions to resolve the conflict
with Israel’s neighbors. Furthermore, ample evidence revealed episodes of haredi
communal violence directed outwardly at Zionist targets and inwardly at deviant
haredim. Despite these incidents, this violence is characterized not by excess, but by
restraint. As the haredim assign a precious value to all Jewish life, their violence usually
stops short of extremes that result in death. This chapter ended by offering three reasons
why haredi violence may escalate in the future. Although future violence is by no means
imminent, the potential for it certainly exists.
In the final analysis, the haredi tradition of adherence to principles of nonviolence and pacifism seems to be a legitimate justification for yeshiva students’
avoidance of military service, and episodes of haredi violence appear to represent more
of an aberration than the norm of traditional haredi values. At the same time, the data
cannot be ignored, as it clearly illustrates a haredi community that does not necessarily
evince a pacifistic political outlook. While it would be satisfying to believe that the
haredi traditions of pacifism and non-violence extend to the political realm, evidence for
this conclusion is lacking. The exceptionally hawkish haredi political opinions outlined
in this chapter leaves no choice but to conclude that haredi yeshiva student military
exemptions cannot be justified on the basis of a distinct and exhibited aversion to war and
violence.
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Chapter Five
–

Jewish Religious Tradition
The third and final hypothesis of this thesis claims that haredi yeshiva students do
not serve in the IDF because Jewish religious law forbids military service. Militaries are
institutions that are inherently tied to violent conflict. As such, military participation
contravenes the yeshiva students’ quest for a spiritually pure and peaceful existence. To
be sure, yeshiva students scrutinize religious texts in order to preserve historical and
communal traditions. Moreover, their studies contribute to the maintenance of the
righteous and unique characteristics of the Jews as a pacifistic people. However, after
much analysis, the evidence for this hypothesis reveals that, in the context of
contemporary Israeli society, yeshiva students possess a convoluted understanding of
their role as religious scholars. In fact, haredi yeshiva students utilize militaristic
terminology to describe their responsibilities. By referring to the Torah as a weapon and
comparing the labor of a yeshiva student to that of a soldier, haredi yeshiva students
project a notion that they represent a quintessential component participating in the
physical protection of the Jewish people. In unpacking this notion, this chapter will show
that the haredim base their belief in the protective power of the yeshiva student on a
historical precedent dating back to the ancient Israelite people. It will then explain the
ways in which the haredim assign war-like properties to the Torah and conclude by
examining the concept that the yeshiva student is analogous to the IDF soldier. When this
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chapter is finished, it will become clear that, through their studies, haredi yeshiva
students sincerely believe that they are actively engaged in the defense of the State of
Israel.

Scriptural Foundations
Although the Jewish people trace their origins to a period of over three thousand
years ago, their long history produced a relative paucity of literature relating to wars and
soldiering. Before the establishment of the State of Israel, few Jewish guidelines for war
and peace existed outside of the Tanakh. 127 Despite the abundance of wars throughout
the Tanakh, there does appear to be a certain condemnation attached to bloodshed on the
one hand and a call for pacifism on the other. For instance, in Deuteronomy 20:10-12,
God commands Moses to search for peaceful options before he goes to war with enemy
nations.
When you march up to attack a city, make its people an offer of peace. If
they accept and open their gates, all the people in it shall be subject to
forced labor and shall work for you. If they refuse to make peace and they
engage you in battle, lay siege to that city.128
While it is not surprising to find references to slavery and slaughter in the Tanakh, this
mention of peacemaking does stand out. It demonstrates that there is, in fact, an ancient
Jewish standard for seeking peaceful resolutions to conflicts as great as war. Alongside
this call to the Israelites to seek peace before going to war, God rebukes one of Judaism’s
most revered figures for the carnage that he has caused. When King David is preparing to
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build the First Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, God tells him that his history of violence has
made him unworthy to construct this most holy site. As told in I Chronicles 22:8, God
admonishes David, “You have shed much blood and have fought many wars. You are not
to build a house for my Name, because you have shed much blood on the earth in my
sight.”129 Perhaps there is not a more powerful motivation for a religious Jew to detest
violence than this example. King David, who had conquered Jerusalem for the specific
purpose of erecting an altar to worship God, was reproached by God for his excessive use
of violence. For the haredi yeshiva student who actively seeks favor in the eyes of God,
King David’s penalty is a compelling justification for avoiding military service.

The Tribe of Levi
The most fascinating aspect of the Tanakh’s guidelines for war and soldiering is
its description of the tribe of Levi. When Moses was leading the Israelites through the
Sinai Desert, God commanded him to take a census of the entire Israelite community and
assign every man who was at least twenty years old to a division in the army. At the same
time, God instructed Moses that members of the tribe of Levi were to be excused from
army service so that they could serve in a religious capacity. Numbers 1:47-53 recounts
God’s command:
The families of the tribe of Levi, however, were not counted along with
the others. The Lord had said to Moses: ‘You must not count the tribe of
Levi or include them in the census of the other Israelites. Instead, appoint
the Levites to be in charge of the tabernacle of the Testimony – over all its
furnishings and everything belonging to it…The Israelites are to set up
their tents by divisions, each man in his own camp under his own
standard. The Levites, however, are to set up their tents around the
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tabernacle of the Testimony so that the wrath will not fall on the Israelite
community. The Levites are to be responsible for the care of the
tabernacle of the Testimony.’130
From this passage, it appears that the Tanakh places a spiritual and temporal duty on the
tribe of Levi. In addition to its role as keepers of the Tabernacle, the Levites are charged
with ensuring that ‘wrath’ does not touch the Israelites. Whether this ‘wrath’ comes from
God or from enemy nations, it most certainly refers to physical harm.
For centuries, members of the tribe of Levi remained protected from military
service. Even after the destruction of the Second Temple and the ensuing exile,
descendents of this tribe played an important religious role in Jewish communities around
the world. In today’s Israel, not every member of the haredi communities has a Levite
ancestor. Nevertheless, they utilize this ancient model to defend their decision to eschew
military service. Their rationale is found primarily in the works of the twelfth-century
Jewish philosopher Maimonides, who examined this precedent and ruled that military
exemptions should be expanded. He wrote:
[The tribe of Levi was] separated for one task – to serve [in the Temple]
and to teach His righteous ways…therefore they were separated from the
ways of the world, and they do not wage war as do the other
Israelites…Not only the tribe of Levi, but any individual whose spirit
moves him to…separate himself to stand before G-d [sic] and to serve him
[sic], to know Him…and he removes from his neck the yoke of
considerations which most people see, behold this person becomes most
holy.131
With this edict, droves of haredim validate their non-service. Service to God sublimates
service to the state. Their role as protectors of the faith is much more critical to the
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security of the nation than all of the soldiers and weaponry of the military. Consequently,
the haredi yeshiva student safeguards the Jewish people from the ‘wrath’ emanating from
earthly and heavenly bodies.
The haredim sincerely believe that the study of the Torah and other divinely
inspired texts has allowed the Jewish people to survive generations of exile and finally
return to the land of their ancestors.132 From merciless persecution at the hands of their
resident nations to the ultimate horror of the Holocaust, the only thing that has sustained
the Jewish people throughout their collective tragedies was the work of a select number
of Jews who remained unwaveringly committed to analyzing God’s Word. Drawing
inspiration from this history, the haredim often refer to the yeshiva students in their
community by commenting, “On his Torah is dependent the whole world.”133 While the
haredi conception of the ‘whole world’ most likely excludes Gentiles, the
aforementioned comment suggests that the fate of the Jewish world is inextricably tied to
the extent to which the Jewish people devote their lives to unraveling the mysteries of
God’s Word. Indeed, the study of the Torah, according to the haredim, is “…the only real
guarantee to the protection and well-being of the Jewish people.”134

The Role of Torah Study in Israel’s National Security
The protective power of Torah study is not limited only to the preservation of
Jewish life. Despite their complex view of war and violence, the haredim also believe
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that the activities of the Torah scholar play an instrumental role on the battlefield in
modern-day Israel.135 Through his studies, the Torah scholar provides heavenly blessings
that supplement the IDF. According to this logic, the IDF would never find victory in the
field of battle without the work of yeshiva students. The haredim point to Psalms 127: 1
for verification of this view. It reads, “Unless the Lord watches over the city, the
watchmen stand guard in vain.”136 The haredim believe that any action without God’s
backing is meaningless and doomed to fail. For all of the effort that the IDF puts into
defending the Jewish state, its endeavors are for naught unless its actions are undertaken
with the belief that God is the ultimate reason that Israel will be able to vanquish its
enemies. Torah study, then, becomes the means by which the Jewish people receive
God’s help during times of tribulation. It is the “secret weapon of the people of Israel”
that allows them achieve miraculous victories in war.137 The haredim point to the
outcomes of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War as evidence, when against all
odds, the IDF emerged victorious.138 Their work in the yeshivot contributed to Israel’s
unprecedented successes on the battlefield during these conflicts. In sum, as Rabbi Shach
once declared, “Other than the Torah we have no security; without it, neither soldiers nor
the IDF will save us.”139
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Furthermore, the haredim believe that the losses Israel suffers on the battlefield
are directly correlated to the societal currents in Israeli society. More accurately, the
haredim contend that God punishes Israel for its lack of faith. For example, the First Gulf
War marked the first time that Israelis felt vulnerable within the boundaries of Israel
proper. Not counting the First Intifada or the shelling of Northern Israel during the 1980s,
the First Gulf War ushered in a new era in which Israeli citizens no longer felt safe within
the confines of the large cities along Israel’s coast. Never before had Israelis felt the
devastating effects of war at home until Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles began to rain
down on Tel Aviv and Haifa. The haredim explained this phenomenon as a consequence
of Israel’s rapid shift toward secularization. The First Gulf War was “a divine rebuke to
the secular arrogance of contemporary Israel…God was reminding Israel that its rightful
role is not in waging war but in faith in the eternal protective power of God.”140 Backing
up this claim is the fact that the early 1990s witnessed a Labor-led government that
appeared to be committed to reversing religious trends in the public square. According to
Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, a pre-election survey in 1992 demonstrated that 29
percent of Israelis “support[ed] public life according to Jewish religious law,” as opposed
to 43-51 percent in earlier years.141 In essence, the haredim believe that Israel found itself
under siege precisely because it was moving away from God. As a result, God allowed
Israel’s enemies to wreak havoc on the Jewish people. No amount of soldiers or weapons
could reverse this development. The only solution lay in returning to the folds of
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traditional religious life. As the haredi Rabbi Menachem Zeev Maor once instructed,
Israel had to find a way “…to mend the reason the enemies were sent by God.”142 The
haredim, for their part, embrace this task.
In his acceptance of this mission, the haredi yeshiva student goes to war. He
becomes a soldier in a different type of war – a war in which his pursuit of righteousness
allows the Jewish people to enjoy the safety behind God’s shield. His involvement in this
war is as important, if not more so, than the valorous sacrifice of the individual IDF
soldier in the field. The war of the yeshiva student takes place in the spiritual realm, a
venue where fighter jets and artillery have no utility.
Whereas the [combat] soldier is involved with physical battles on various
fronts, the Haredi [sic] ‘warrior’ is engaged in a difficult vocation and an
arduous and never-ending war against physical desires…[H]e is engaged
in a far more extensive war, shouldering the weight of prohibitions and
taboos, fighting the evil inclination while adhering to the Torah.143
In this capacity, the haredi yeshiva student becomes an ‘other-worldy’ soldier. He
submits himself to service in a battle that has been fought since time immemorial, the
metaphysical struggle between good and evil. He fights on behalf of the entire Jewish
people, making certain that they do not unwittingly relinquish their spiritual anointing as
God’s Chosen People.144
Due to their involvement in this spiritual conflict, the haredim justify nonenlistment in the IDF by claiming that they split the burden of defense with their military
counterparts. Haredi authorities employ military concepts to explain their reasoning. Like
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any other unit of the military, they claim, yeshiva students must hone their craft without
any deviation. In order for them to become experts in the field of Torah study, they must
completely immerse themselves in their work and perfect their responsibilities through
training and repetition. Rabbi Neugerschall writes,
I am for integration, but don’t we need the sea commandos? The artillery?
The armoured corps?...But can you be a pilot for one week and then you
are off for another week? A week as a sea commando? Everyone
understands that in this manner you will not have anything. The structure
of the army is such that each unit has its own flag and soldiers…and the
Torah is our weapon.145
From this point of view, yeshiva students constitute their own division. If they are
disturbed, for any reason, their value as spiritual ‘warriors’ suffers. Some haredi
authorities even believe that yeshiva students add such an important component to
defense that the IDF should attach soldiers to yeshivot to protect the students from all
outside interference. “If the government knew how much [Torah] students protect the
state’s well-being through their study, it would put guards in the schools, making sure
that learning is never interrupted.”146 This statement reflects the haredi view that the
Israeli government fails to appreciate exactly how much yeshiva students contribute to
the protection of the State of Israel. Like the IDF, yeshiva students are an integral
component in matters of national security. An analogy from a member of the Chief
Rabbinate adequately sums up this belief: “It’s like any machine, even if you are missing
one screw it can’t continue. One little screw can’t get up and say, ‘I am the most
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important’ because you need all of the parts of the machine…everyone has his role.”147 It
follows, then, that if haredi yeshiva students are conscripted, Israel’s entire defense
‘machine’ will fail to function.

Conclusion
This chapter has provided the religious and spiritual reasoning behind the haredi
communities’ avoidance of military service. After much analysis, there is not enough
evidence to conclude that Jewish religious law forbids military service. Nor is there
sufficient evidence to safely determine that the Jewish religion is inherently pacifistic in
nature. While there are scriptural examples depicting a traditional Jewish recourse to
peace as well as a powerful contempt for excessive bloodshed, it is difficult to defend a
conclusion that argues for a total Jewish rejection of violence. After all, the ancient
Israelite people established their kingdom primarily at the tip of a sword. It is, however,
safe to conclude that, from the perspective of the haredim, military service does present a
problem for the yeshiva student’s quest for a spiritually pure and peaceful existence. As
modern-day representatives of the tribe of Levi, haredi yeshiva students have one role: to
serve God. Interruption of this duty, especially for the purpose of going to war, is strictly
forbidden. At the same time, yeshiva students frequently refer to their studies and lifestyle as a war. They are constantly at war to fend off spiritually malignant desires and
temptations, and only their Torah studies successfully overcome these enemies. In so
doing, they believe that they add an essential element to the defense of the Jewish people.
Through their quest for righteousness and purity, haredi yeshiva students protect the
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State of Israel and augment the IDF’s tactics in battle. Ultimately, this reasoning provides
haredi yeshiva students both an excuse to avoid conscription and a case for inclusion into
Israel’s body politic. Haredi yeshiva students do perform service to the State of Israel, a
service beyond the confines of earthly understanding.
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Chapter Six
–

Conclusions
At the beginning of this paper, three hypotheses were offered with the intent to
discover why haredi yeshiva students do not serve in the IDF. First, haredi yeshiva
students do not serve in the IDF because they do not want to. After much research, there
is compelling evidence to accept this argument. Because the majority of haredim are antiZionist, they reject most Israeli institutions. In so doing, they believe that they remove
themselves from the obligations incumbent upon Israeli citizens. Haredi yeshiva students
also fear the repercussions of interrupting their studies to report for military service. If
they choose to enlist, their efficacy as a scholar will be affected, secularizing forces will
jade their worldview, and they will encounter resentment among their haredi brethren
upon returning to the folds of traditional haredi life. As a result, young haredi males fear
the societal repercussions attached to military service, so they choose not to enlist.
The second hypothesis suggested that haredi yeshiva students are political
pacifists. It was learned that the tenets of pacifism have resonated in haredi communities
long before the establishment of the State of Israel. It was also discovered that the haredi
communities possess cultural taboos against violence. Even with these minor incidents of
communal violence in past decades, the haredim exhibit an aversion to any action that
results in major physical injury and/or death. Despite this tradition of pacifism, however,
haredi public opinion is significantly hawkish and indisposed to the politics of peace. Not
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only do they favor military solutions to conflict, but they also oppose non-violent
remedies such as treaties and political settlements. Given such evidence, the hypothesis
that the haredim avoid military service because they are intrinsically pacifistic must be
refuted.
The final hypothesis surmised that haredi yeshiva students do not serve in the IDF
because Jewish religious law forbids military service. There is no evidence in the
research findings to support this hypothesis. Although the Tanakh instructs that members
of the tribe of Levi are to be exempted from military service, it is inconceivable that
every member of Israel’s haredi communities is a descendent of the Levites.
Furthermore, haredi yeshiva students believe that, through their studies, they are engaged
in a spiritual war, a role that complements actual IDF soldiers. Haredi scholars justify
their non-enlistment by claiming that their work in the yeshivot has directly contributed
to Israel’s major war victories. While the haredim may truly believe that their studies add
an integral element to Israel’s national defense, there is no way to corroborate this claim.
As such, this hypothesis must be rejected. Haredi yeshiva students can wage this spiritual
battle just as effectively while serving in the IDF. In modern-day Israel, physical security
ultimately outweighs spiritual security.
When this research question and its accompanying hypotheses were first unveiled,
each argument was couched in terms informed by the principles of conflict resolution.
However, after sifting through the research, there is no evidence to suggest that haredi
yeshiva students avoid military service for any reason related to conflict resolution.
Although it was concluded that the haredim simply do not want to serve in the IDF, they
are motivated less by an aversion to violent conflict than by a fear of negative social
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repercussions associated with military service and an antipathy for Zionist institutions
and social constructs. Moreover, the evidence convincingly dispels the hypothesis that
haredi yeshiva students justify non-service on the basis of pacifistic political beliefs. Far
from projecting political opinions resembling anything close to support for peaceful
conflict resolution methods, the haredim exhibit overwhelmingly hawkish and aggressive
political attitudes. Finally, there is no concrete evidence to support the hypothesis that the
haredim rely upon a Jewish religious tradition of conflict resolution to account for their
non-service. The haredi yeshiva students reason that, instead of inducing them to search
for peaceful solutions to conflict, their close adherence to Jewish religious tradition
obliges them to pray for the success of the IDF on the battlefield by asking God to
destroy Israel’s enemies. In sum, the results of the research clearly indicate that the
haredim demonstrate little to no commitment to a peaceful resolution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Unfortunately, any hope that the haredim may serve as a peaceful
model for other Jewish Israelis to emulate remains but a mere fantasy.

The Future of Haredi Exemptions
In all likelihood, this policy will not be reversed any time soon. This is due to the
fact that ultra-Orthodox haredi parties are firmly entrenched in the Knesset, and statistics
indicate that their hold on political power will only strengthen in the coming years. A
Central Bureau of Statistics survey, released in 2008, shows that in 2006, 7.5 percent of
respondents, aged 20 and older, self-identified themselves as ultra-Orthodox.148 During

148

Central Bureau of Statistics, “Statistical Abstract of Israel 2008, Table 7.4: Persons Aged 20 and Over,
by Religiosity and by Selected Characteristics”; available from http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/
shnatone_new.htm?CYear=2008&Vol=59&CSubject=7; Internet; accessed 10 June 2009.

88

the same period, ultra-Orthodox political parties made up 15 percent (12 Shas MKs and 6
United Torah Judaism MKs) of the Seventeenth Knesset, in session from 17 April 2006
to 24 February 2009.149 Although this overrepresentation is staggering, demographic
trends in the haredi communities are expected to push this disparity to further extremes.
Haredi elementary school students comprise 25 percent of all Israeli elementary school
pupils, and haredi secondary school students make up 20 percent.150 When these children
reach voting-age, the haredi communities, “…will have an incontrovertible demographic
advantage vis-à-vis the overwhelming majority of the Jewish electorate in Israel.”151 With
this political power, it is difficult to envision any change in the current policy of haredi
IDF exemptions. Barring an unexpected shift in haredi attitudes toward military service,
the policy will continue as is, and future generations of haredi yeshiva students will
represent a vast proportion of draft-age Jewish Israeli males unaffected by IDF
conscription procedures.
Two strands of thought exist regarding this development. On one hand, some
voices within the IDF argue that haredi recruits are not needed in the military. These
voices stress that the IDF is already inundated with recruits, and it is finding it
increasingly difficult to incorporate these draftees. At present, annual draft pools are
flooded with ‘baby-boomers,’ born in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and
currently reaching conscription age, as well as the influx of thousands of draft-age
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immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia.152 Moreover, there are signals
from the IDF that is it considering terminating the policy of universal conscription
altogether.153 On the other hand, high-ranking IDF officials vehemently deny the notion
that the IDF does not need haredi recruits. Former IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan
Halutz argued that, “This phenomenon will not be able to continue for much longer for
the simple reason that we will cross a line that without this critical number of recruits the
defense establishment will not be able to fulfill its missions.”154 These officials complain
that, due to the lack of draft-age recruits, reserve soldiers are bearing too much of the
burden. The former head of the IDF Manpower Directorate, Maj.-Gen. Elazar Stern,
wants to ease the burden of these reserve soldiers, since they are being called upon too
frequently to report for combat duty. Stern would like to see reservists report only for
training, as elongated combat duty interrupts their family and professional lives. In order
to do this, Stern says, the IDF needs more draft-age recruits to perform compulsory
service.155
At the present time, both of these arguments are valid, and it is impossible to
accept either position given the evidence. What is certain, however, is that the
controversy over haredi yeshiva student exemptions will remain volatile for the
foreseeable future. Only a policy shift, either a move toward legitimate universal
conscription or an end to it altogether, will assuage the tempestuous emotions engendered
by this issue.
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If there is no change, the potential social repercussions of this policy are
troubling, as the emotions surrounding it only serve to exacerbate an already tense
relationship between the haredim and other segments of Jewish Israeli society. There
exists a deep chasm between the political opinions of the haredim and the rest of the
Jewish Israeli population, a split that poses an imminent threat to the stability of Israeli
society. Not only do the haredim resist Israeli attempts to broker peace deals, but they
also strive to impose their own version of Judaism on the rest of the population, an action
that unambiguously aggravates non-haredi Jewish Israelis.
…Non-religious Jews are confronted with a sector that is interested in
more than maintaining its own well-being, and seeks to imprint its
inclinations on the social order as a whole. The ultra-Orthodox are by no
means ready to dismiss their self-image as holders of the “only” authentic
Judaism, which, they firmly believe, should be abided by all Jews. As
such, they definitely represent a conflictual factor of anti-status quo,
aiming at the limitation of the non-religious’ freedom of action.156
This combination of anti-peace political opinions and the burdensome attempt to enforce
strict religious societal norms has set the haredi communities on a collision course with
the majority of Jewish Israelis. As illustrated by an additional survey provided by Eliezer
Ben-Rafael, the tension between these segments of society is authentic, and the potential
for intra-Jewish conflict is all too real. Of the ultra-Orthodox respondents who were
asked, “to what extent do you perceive tension between yourself and non-religious Israeli
Jews?,” 69 percent answered that they perceived tensions, 47 percent of whom perceived
sharp tensions (see Table 7). While these numbers are harrowing, the responses of the
non-religious vis-à-vis the ultra-Orthodox present an even more ominous picture.
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Table 7: Perceptions of Tensions between Religiosity Categories.
To what extent do you perceive tension between the following categories? (%)
Members of Categories
vis-à-vis others

Sharp
Tensions

Some
Tensions

No
Tension

Number

Non-religious vis-à-vis
ultra-Orthodox

69

19

12

411

Ultra-Orthodox vis-à-vis
non-religious

47

22

31

48

Source: Eliezer Ben-Rafael, "The Faces of Religiosity in Israel:
Cleavages or Continuum?," Israel Studies 13, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 113.

Almost 90 percent of the non-religious respondents perceived tension, and 69 percent
perceived sharp tensions.157 If these tensions remain unchecked, Israeli society could very
well be torn asunder, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could persist interminably. How,
then, can Jewish Israelis assuage these political and religious tensions so that Israel as a
whole can approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a united and confident front?

A Practical Solution
Before closing, the proposition of a practical and relatively innocuous solution to
this controversial issue is in order. This thesis has explained that neither the Nahal
Haredi battalion nor the Tal Law has met the expectations with which they were initiated.
Still, a model exists that may prove more successful in integrating increasing numbers of
haredi young men into the IDF. The Hesder Yeshivot is the inspiration for this model.

157

Ben-Rafael, “The Faces of Religiosity,” 113.

92

Hesder Yeshivot (‘arrangement academies’) combine Torah study with military
service. Beginning in 1965, then Prime Minister Levi Eshkol approved this project in an
attempt to attract non-haredi religious men to service in the IDF. Much like the haredim,
the rabbis of these young men feared the secularizing effects of the military and spoke
out against military service.158 Nevertheless, Eshkol was able to strike a deal with these
non-haredi rabbis in which the students who chose to serve in this arrangement would not
be entirely removed from their religious life-style and studies. Students who choose this
option agree to a five-year term of service.159 Upon enlistment at age 18, hesder students
undergo a six-month period of basic training, after which they are allowed to leave the
army and resume Torah studies at their yeshiva. For the next four-and-a-half years,
hesder students are periodically called up, much like reserve soldiers, for active duty that
does not exceed a total of sixteen months. During all periods of active duty, hesder
students serve in completely homogeneous units, thus mitigating the dangerous influence
of secular soldiers.160
Since the first experiment in 1965, Hesder Yeshivot have proven to be a rousing
success. Currently, forty Hesder Yeshivot provide 1,200 annual recruits, totaling about
6,000 hesder soldiers altogether.161 The vast majority of Torah scholars who choose to
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serve within the hesder arrangement come from the National-Religious camp. Unlike the
haredim, these religious young men embrace Zionism and fully believe in service to their
country. The comments of one hesder student adequately demonstrate the differences in
outlook between these young religious men and young haredi men.
We advocate [military service] because we are convinced that, given our
circumstances – would that they be better – military service is a mitzvah
[commandment], and a most important one at that. Without impugning the
patriotism and ethical posture of those who think otherwise, we feel that
for the overwhelming majority of [Torah scholars], defense is a moral
imperative.162
In their zeal for the Zionist enterprise, many hesder units serve in some of the most
intense combat situations. This eagerness to place their lives in the midst of such conflict
is reflected in their total proportion of IDF fatalities during the Second Intifada. The
distribution of combat deaths during this conflict reveal that the proportion of hesder
soldiers killed is almost twice the rate of the whole Jewish Israeli male population.163 As
unfortunate as this statistic is, it certainly speaks to the success of the Hesder Yeshivot.
Because the Hesder Yeshivot project is associated with the National-Religious
movement, haredi yeshiva students are most likely not suited for it. Yet, if the IDF
initiated a similar project based in haredi traditions, the results may ease the tensions
surrounding the policy of haredi yeshiva student exemptions. In order for this project to
work, however, the new haredi military framework must allow haredi young men to
enlist in the IDF at the age of 18. One of the major shortcomings of the Tal Law is that
the ‘decision year’ allows haredi yeshiva students to postpone their decision to enlist,
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work or remain in the yeshiva until the age of 22, when they are most likely to be married
with children.164 With large families to support and already well entrenched in the haredi
community, these young men do not have the freedom to make the decision to leave the
confines of the haredi world and experience life outside its walls. In spite of this, there is
reason to believe that future generations of young haredi men may not be as antienlistment as their older community leaders. As Israel grows older and the ‘travesty’ of
the establishment of an un-messianic Jewish state fades into memory, younger
generations of haredim may begin to relinquish the anti-Zionist attitudes maintained by
older generations. This may result in an increasing acceptance of the State of Israel as
well as a rise in the number of young haredi males who feel an obligation to participate
in the nation’s defense. An option to enlist at the age of 18 may be a major catalyst in
fostering this change.
Should young haredi men choose this path, they would have two primary options.
First, they could join a revamped version of the Nahal Haredi battalion if they wished to
uphold their religious and communal traditions. The new version of Nahal would closely
mirror the Hesder Yeshivot, comprising an initial six-month term of training followed by
a four-and-a-half year combination of Torah study and active military service. Nahal
units would remain segregated by gender, and the soldiers would be offered daily
opportunities to study and pray. In addition, they would be allowed frequent opportunities
to contact their community rabbis. In this scenario, military service may eventually come
to represent a powerful act of worship, much like it already does for National-Religious
soldiers. The second option would be to join a regular IDF battalion. As it stands now,
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young haredi men encounter few prospects for escaping the confines of their
communities. Enlistment in a battalion made up of secular and non-haredi religious
soldiers would offer an opportunity to experience a new way of life. At 18-years-old,
these young haredim would encounter fresh perspectives from non-haredi Israelis that
may encourage them to break out of the walls of parochial haredi life in order to find
their own unique path. The lasting bonds formed and the lessons learned in the IDF
would equip these young haredim with the tools necessary to lead a life all their own,
unimpeded by the restrictions and taboos that characterize haredi communities. Either
option is promising. In the end though, the IDF cannot wait until young haredi men are
well established in their communities. It must reach them at the impressionable and
carefree age of 18.

Limitations
The data used in this thesis are limited by the low numbers of haredim who are
willing to participate in surveys. Although the public opinion statistics in this thesis
include haredi voices, they are not fully representative of all haredi communities, as in
each survey, the proportion of haredi respondents to all other respondents is considerably
lower than the actual proportion of haredim to the rest of Jewish Israeli society. If a
higher proportion of haredim had participated in these surveys, the results may have
revealed political opinions that differed from the conclusions put forward in this thesis.
Moreover, an extensive series of in-depth interviews would have certainly added
an important dimension to this thesis. Yet, interviews with haredim can be problematic.
As noted by several researchers who have attempted to penetrate Israel’s haredi
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communities for the purpose of conducting research, members of the haredi
communities, by and large, shy away from interviews with non-haredi researchers. Even
if a haredi individual consents to an interview, his/her comments must necessarily be
analyzed with caution. Due to the extent of social control that haredi authorities exercise
over their communities, it is reasonable to suspect that haredi responses may represent an
official position rather than an honest individual opinion. For this reason, a diversity of
viewpoints may not become apparent, as may have certainly been the case in the previous
chapter that analyzed the comments of haredi yeshiva students regarding their role in
Israel’s national security. There may indeed exist a haredi yeshiva student who disagrees
with the notion that his religious studies contribute to Israel’s battlefield victories, but he
may be too intimidated to say so. This also extends to other popular haredi beliefs,
including the official haredi position on military service. There is reason to suspect that a
haredi young man would find it difficult to admit to a personal desire to serve in the IDF.
If he did confess to such a desire and his peers found out, he may well be expelled from
the haredi world. Notwithstanding these problems associated with haredi interviews, this
method of research would have undoubtedly provided this thesis with an opportunity to
ascertain if there is any variance among individual haredi attitudes toward military
service.

Further Research
The emphasis of any future research should be on the conclusions derived from
the first hypothesis, focusing specifically on the reasons why haredi young men do not
want to serve in the IDF. To start, an original study should be conducted that seeks to
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gauge the attitudes of younger generations of haredim to Zionism. As was explained in
this thesis, older generations of haredim possess a strong antipathy to Zionism, which has
partly contributed to their refusal to serve in the military. What is unclear is to what
extent this hostility has passed down to younger generations. After all, the younger
generations were not alive to witness the “catastrophe” that was the establishment of the
State of Israel. If younger generations of haredim display a more amenable attitude
toward Zionism, this particular justification for non-service may not only lose much of its
influence over haredi young men, but it may also signify the beginning of a closer haredi
relationship to the state.
In addition, further research should be conducted to analyze the experience of
haredi soldiers in the Nahal Battalion. This effort should seek to determine if these
“soldier-scholars” have suffered negative social and/or spiritual repercussions as a result
of their decision to serve in the IDF. Questions relating to the justifications for nonservice should include: How have your friends and family members reacted to your
decision to serve in the IDF? Are the prospects for finding a suitable haredi wife any
different now that you have joined the IDF? How has military service affected your
Torah studies? How has military service affected your relationship with God? Although
this thesis has recounted many of the justifications that haredi young men point to as a
reason for not serving, this further research would make it possible to gauge the extent to
which these justifications are grounded in reality. By performing a study on the haredim
who decide to enlist in the IDF, this further research could satisfactorily determine if
negative social and spiritual repercussion do, in fact, befall the haredi young man who
chooses to become an IDF solider.
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